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A FUNCTIONAL THEORY OF CONGRESSIONAL
STANDING
Jonathan Remy Nash*
The Supreme Court has offered scarce and inconsistent guidance on congres-
sional standing—that is, when houses of Congress or members of Congress
have Article III standing. The Court’s most recent foray into congressional
standing has prompted lower courts to infuse analysis with separation-of-
powers concerns in order to erect a high standard for congressional standing. It
has also invited the Department of Justice to argue that Congress lacks stand-
ing to enforce subpoenas against executive branch actors.
Injury to congressional litigants should be defined by reference to Congress’s
constitutional functions. Those functions include gathering relevant informa-
tion, casting votes, and (even when no vote is ever cast) exercising bargaining
power over the scope of legislation. Accordingly, congressional standing can
extend not only to cases of actual vote nullification (as extant Supreme Court
precedent suggests), but also to cases in which (1) congressional plaintiffs val-
idly seek information from the executive branch, and (2) the limited circum-
stance in which the executive branch has acted so as to threaten permanent
and substantial diminution in congressional bargaining power—provided that
enough legislators join the suit to lay claim to the relevant institutional bar-
gaining power.
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Introduction
The House of Representatives’ recent decision to authorize filing a law-
suit against President Barack Obama and his administration1 with respect to
the President’s implementation of the Patient Protection and Affordable
Care Act2—and the filing of a suit a few months later3—has focused atten-
tion on the House’s standing to bring such a lawsuit in federal court.4 Com-
mentators—including many who are sympathetic to the arguments that the
lawsuit advanced on the merits—have questioned whether the House can
claim proper federal court standing.5
The controversy over the possibility of the House suing President
Obama is not the only recent example of congressional standing emerging
from the theoretical shadows. Under both President George W. Bush and
President Obama, the Department of Justice invoked the Supreme Court’s
1. See H.R. 676, 113th Cong. (2014).
2. Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010).
3. See U.S. House of Reps. v. Burwell, No. 14-1967(RMC), 2015 WL 5294762 (D.D.C.
Sept. 9, 2015) (recognizing standing of the House of Representatives to raise claim challenging
the executive branch’s actions with respect to the Affordable Care Act).
Members of Congress joined a second suit challenging President Obama’s executive action
with respect to immigration in 2015. See Mike Lillis, 113 Republicans Back Lawsuit Against
Obama’s Immigration Actions, The Hill (May 11, 2015, 5:23 PM), http://thehill.com/
homenews/house/241668-113-republicans-back-lawsuit-against-obamas-immigration-actions;
see also Karoun Demirjian & Kelsey Snell, House Conservatives May End Up in Court to Kill
Iran Deal, Wash. Post. (Sept. 10, 2015), http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/powerpost/
wp/2015/09/10/house-conservatives-may-end-up-in-court-to-kill-iran-deal/?wpmm=1&wpi
src=nl_evening (describing how some House members were considering, upon the failure of
Congress to stop the Obama administration’s nuclear deal with Iran, resort to a lawsuit to
keep the President from enforcing the agreement on the ground that relevant documentation
was withheld from Congress).
4. See, e.g., Sam Baker, Will Boehner’s Obamacare Lawsuit Work? Legal Experts Question
Whether the House Has Standing to Sue the President, Nat’l J. (July 14, 2014), http://www
.nationaljournal.com/health-care/will-boehner-s-obamacare-lawsuit-work-20140714.
5. See, e.g., Stephanie Condon, John Boehner’s Obamacare Lawsuit Isn’t Really About
Obamacare, CBS News (July 16, 2014, 5:58 AM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/john-
boehners-obamacare-lawsuit-isnt-really-about-obamacare/ (noting that while Professor
Jonathan Turley “and some other legal scholars say the executive branch has assumed so much
power, a lawsuit is necessary to recalibrate the balance between the three branches of govern-
ment,” Turley still states that, “[i]t is the threshold question of standing that is the most
difficult step for a lawsuit of this kind”).
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decision in Raines v. Byrd6—the Court’s last direct foray into congressional
standing—to support the argument that a House committee investigating
the executive branch lacked standing to raise a judicial challenge to claims of
executive privilege.7 And, when the executive branch declined to defend the
constitutionality of the Defense of Marriage Act8 (“DOMA”) in United States
v. Windsor,9 the House of Representatives argued that its “Bipartisan Legal
Advisory Group”—which articulates the House’s legal arguments in
courts10—had standing as an intervenor to defend the law in the executive’s
6. 521 U.S. 811 (1997).
7. See Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform v. Holder, 979 F. Supp. 2d 1, 12–13
(D.D.C. 2013) (noting that, “while th[e government’s] position was adamantly advanced,
there was a notable absence of support for it set forth in the defendant’s pleadings, and oral
argument revealed that the executive’s contention rests almost entirely on one case: Raines v.
Byrd”); Comm. on the Judiciary v. Miers, 558 F. Supp. 2d 53, 66 (D.D.C. 2008) (“[T]he Com-
mittee’s injury is ‘governmental’ rather than ‘personal,’ the argument goes. . . . That, the
Executive says, is the upshot of the Supreme Court’s decision in Raines, which jettisoned the
concept of so-called ‘legislative’ standing.” (quoting Raines, 521 U.S. at 820, 829)).
The congressional investigations out of which these cases grew—one by a Democratic
House of a Republican administration and the other by a Republican House of a Democratic
administration—both focused on politically charged issues. The investigation that prompted
the Miers decision involved allegations that the President had improperly dismissed several
U.S. Attorneys. See 558 F. Supp. 2d at 57–58. For discussion of the underlying legal dispute,
see Josh Chafetz, Executive Branch Contempt of Congress, 76 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1083, 1086–89
(2009). And the underlying congressional investigation in Holder involved the “Fast and Furi-
ous” program, pursuant to which the Bureau of Alcohol Tobacco and Firearms “knowingly
allowed firearms purchased illegally in the United States to be unlawfully transferred to third-
parties and transported into Mexico,” with the goal of “enabl[ing] ATF to follow the flow of
the firearms to the Mexican drug cartels that purchased them.” 979 F. Supp. 2d at 5.
District courts in both cases rejected the Department of Justice’s arguments. See id. at
13–14 (noting that “[a] reading of the entire [Raines] opinion reveals that the problem that
prompted the dismissal was not the fact that legislators were suing the executive; it was that the
plaintiffs had suffered no concrete, personal harm, and they were simply complaining that the
Act would result in some ‘abstract dilution’ of the power of Congress as a whole” (quoting
Raines, 521 U.S. at 826), and also distinguishing Raines since in Holder, the institution sup-
ported the lawsuit); Miers, 558 F. Supp. 2d at 67–70 (distinguishing Raines on the ground that
there, unlike the case at bar, the House as an institution did not support the lawsuit, and
concluding that Raines did not undercut preexisting circuit precedent that the House had
standing to enforce a subpoena since in Raines “the injury was conceived of only in abstract,
future terms,” but in Miers the harm resulting from leaving a validly issued House subpoena
unenforced was “evident”).
The Miers case did not proceed beyond the district court on the standing issue. The D.C.
Circuit granted a motion for stay pending appeal, but an agreement was reached resolving the
case before an appeal could be heard. See Chafetz, supra, at 1092–93.
The Holder case continues within the jurisdiction of the district court as of this writing.
See Order, Holder, No. 12-1332 (ABJ) (Aug. 20, 2014) (ordering the Justice Department to
prepare a log of privilege claims in anticipation of in camera review).
8. Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996) (codified at 1 U.S.C. § 7 & 28 U.S.C.
§ 1738C), invalidated in part by United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013).
9. 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013).
10. See Reply Brief on the Merits for Respondent the Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group of
the United States House of Representatives at i n.*, Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (No. 12-307),
2013 WL 267026 (“The United States House of Representatives has articulated its institutional
position in litigation matters through a five-member bipartisan leadership group since at least
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stead (a claim the Supreme Court left undecided in that case).11 Indeed, at
least one commentator has suggested that the Court should recognize Con-
gress’s standing in general to defend laws against constitutional challenge
when the executive branch has declined to do so.12
These disputes over the ability of a house of Congress to file suit form
part of a larger debate over “congressional standing” to participate in litiga-
tion before the federal courts. Congressional standing also encompasses
whether a house of Congress can act as a defendant in a lawsuit—for exam-
ple, defending a challenge to a law’s constitutionality when the executive
branch has conceded the challenge—and suits brought by individual federal
legislators and blocs of legislators.
In fact, the Supreme Court’s guidance on congressional standing has
been both scarce and inconsistent. The Supreme Court has directly con-
fronted congressional standing in only two cases, accepting it in Powell v.
McCormack,13 and more recently rejecting it in Raines v. Byrd,14 in which the
Court suggested more broadly—but in dicta—that congressional standing
may be quite constrained.15 In a case from this past June, Arizona State Legis-
lature v. Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission,16 the Court endorsed
the standing of a state legislature in a way that could be read to support
congressional standing,17 but cited the language from Raines to specifically
state that its holding did not extend to the question of congressional
standing.18
The lower courts have had greater experience with, and generally have
been more open to, claims of congressional standing. The U.S. Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit—which has, not surprisingly,
seen the bulk of congressional standing cases—has favored assertions of
congressional standing, to the vocal displeasure of then-D.C. Circuit Judges
the early 1980s . . . .”). At the time, the BLAG consisted of Speaker of the House Boehner,
Majority Leader Cantor, Majority Whip McCarthy, Democratic Leader Pelosi, and Democratic
Whip Hoyer. Id.
11. The Court concluded—despite the executive branch’s failure to defend DOMA—that
“the United States retains a stake sufficient to support Article III jurisdiction” by virtue of its
failure to have paid the plaintiff the refund of taxes she was due if DOMA was unconstitu-
tional. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2686. To be sure, the executive branch’s agreement with the
plaintiff over the governing law meant that an adversity between the parties was absent, but
adversity, the Court explained, was merely a prudential aspect of standing, not a constitutional
one. Id. at 2686–87. And the BLAG’s willingness to defend DOMA zealously removed that
concern. Id. at 2687–88. In the end, then, the Court did “not [have to] decide whether BLAG
would have standing to challenge the District Court’s ruling and its affirmance in the Court of
Appeals on BLAG’s own authority.” Id. at 2688.
12. See Brianne J. Gorod, Defending Executive Nondefense and the Principal-Agent Prob-
lem, 106 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1201, 1247–50 (2012).
13. 395 U.S. 486 (1969); see infra text accompanying notes 56–60.
14. 521 U.S. 811 (1997).
15. See infra notes 61–85 and accompanying text.
16. 135 S. Ct. 2652 (2015).
17. See infra Section I.B.
18. Ariz. State Legislature, 135 S. Ct. at 2665 n.12.
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Bork and Scalia.19 Still, the D.C. Circuit has relied on “equitable discretion”
to allow itself, and the district court below it, to pick and choose the con-
gressional standing cases to hear.20 Neither the lower courts nor scholarly
commentators, however, have provided an overarching theory to justify this
approach.
This Article offers what Supreme Court cases, lower court cases, and
commentary have failed to provide—a coherent theory of congressional
standing. In particular, the Article argues that the Constitution supports a
robust, but limited, role for congressional standing. The theory links stand-
ing to the primary functions of Congress: voting and information gathering.
In particular, the theory seeks to define cognizable “injuries”—the central
hurdle that plaintiffs face in establishing standing—in terms of congres-
sional functions.21
A functional theory of congressional standing would recognize standing
in limited circumstances, such as when a majority of a house of Congress (or
enough legislators to effect a particular outcome) challenged executive ac-
tion that systematically and substantially diminished the majority’s bargain-
ing power.22 At the same time, because standing would be limited to those
cases, it would not throw open the federal courthouse doors to legislators
dissatisfied with particular political outcomes.23 Prudential standing limita-
tions could be harnessed further to ensure that political disputes are not
relitigated in the courts.24
This functional approach to congressional standing is logical and pro-
ductive for several reasons. First, a functional approach more fully appreci-
ates the breadth to which the power to vote—not just the actual casting of
votes—is a crucial congressional function. The power to vote can shape the
law even when no vote is ever taken.25 The functional approach also ac-
knowledges Congress’s important information-gathering functions.
Second, a functional approach vindicates the separation-of-powers val-
ues that underlie constitutional standing by limiting standing to cases in
which there is an actual injury to congressional function.26 At the same time,
it does so without allowing those values to hijack the essential standing anal-
ysis, as the approach some courts take today does.
Third, a functional approach also enhances congressional (and presi-
dential) accountability. Ensuring that Congress has the capacity to vindicate
its ability to engage in its functions reduces the risk that the public will
19. See infra note 131 and accompanying text.
20. See Riegle v. Fed. Open Mkt. Comm., 656 F.2d 873, 881 (D.C. Cir. 1981); see also
infra notes 135–138 and accompanying text.
21. See infra Section III.B.
22. See infra Section III.B.
23. See infra text accompanying notes 183–186.
24. See infra Sections IV.B.1, IV.D.
25. See infra note 168 and accompanying text.
26. As I explain below, this is more the case if separation of powers is seen through a
functionalist, as opposed to a formalist, lens. See infra text accompanying notes 169–171.
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erroneously assign credit (and blame) to branches of government to which it
is not due.27
Fourth, a functional approach to congressional standing vindicates not
only Congress, but also indirectly the interests of the states. Professor Her-
bert Wechsler famously argued that the constitutional structure of the fed-
eral government preserves states’ interests.28 That is perhaps nowhere more
true than in the structure of the U.S. Senate, in which members are elected
on a state-by-state basis, and each state elects two senators regardless of pop-
ulation.29 If congressional functions further state interests, then an unneces-
sarily narrow view of congressional standing that fails to incorporate core
congressional functions—such as the view the Supreme Court adopted—
also fails to adequately protect state interests.30
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I surveys the landscape of congres-
sional standing, as expounded by both the Supreme Court and the lower
federal courts. It reveals how, especially recently, courts have mainly extolled
separation of powers as a basis for denying standing, while ignoring the
various functions that the Constitution assigns to Congress in assessing in-
jury in fact.
Part II then considers some of these functions in greater detail. These
functions include some, like collecting votes, that the Constitution expressly
contemplates, and others, like the gathering of information, in which Con-
gress has long engaged and that the Court has recognized as foundational.
Part III defends the functional approach to congressional standing. It
shows that a functional approach is broadly consistent with existing stand-
ing doctrine and vindicates separation-of-powers concerns. It also identifies
and evaluates the benefits of a functional approach to congressional stand-
ing, discussing in particular how the functional approach enhances demo-
cratic accountability and can aid states in asserting their sovereign interests.
Part IV relies on the functional analysis in Part II to derive the contours
of congressional standing. It elucidates the possibilities for congressional
standing based on information, voting power, and bargaining power. With
respect to congressional standing based on an alleged shift in bargaining
power from the legislative branch to the executive, Part IV highlights one
factor—the scope of the shift in bargaining power—that will greatly influ-
ence whether there is congressional standing, and another factor—the extent
to which the shift in power is the result of unilateral executive action—that
will have an effect, albeit a lesser effect, on whether there is congressional
standing. These factors allow us to rank the settings in which congressional
standing is least to most likely to exist: (1) when the shift in power is minor
27. See infra text accompanying note 182.
28. See Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States in
the Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 Colum. L. Rev. 543 (1954); see
also infra text accompanying notes 191–195.
29. See infra text accompanying notes 192, 195.
30. See infra text accompanying note 196.
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and pursuant to a congressional delegation—for example, Congress delegat-
ing minor discretionary powers to an executive agency; (2) when the shift in
power is minor but the executive branch acts unilaterally—for example, an
executive agency undertaking an internal reorganization; (3) when the shift
in power is major and pursuant to a congressional delegation—for example,
the congressional enactment of the Line Item Veto Act;31 and (4) when the
shift in power is major and the executive branch acts unilaterally—perhaps,
for example, Congress alleging that unilateral executive action effectively
amends a statute without congressional authorization.
I. The Existing Doctrinal State of Congressional Standing
In this Part, I present the current state of congressional standing. It is
often said that the federal government need not establish compliance with
the standard Article III standing requirements (at least in some circum-
stances).32 In reality, however, it is only executive branch actors who have
presumptive standing;33 legislators and legislative bodies must establish
standing34 under Article III.35
31. As I discuss in detail below, the Supreme Court in Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811
(1997), found individual members of Congress lacked standing to challenge the Line Item Veto
Act. See infra text accompanying notes 64–71. As I further discuss below, however, the case
can, and should, be read to turn on the absence of the endorsement of the suit by either house
of Congress. Raines specifically left open the possibility that standing might have been proper
if a house of Congress had endorsed the suit. See infra text accompanying note 78.
32. E.g., Michael G. Collins & Jonathan Remy Nash, Prosecuting Federal Crimes in State
Courts, 97 Va. L. Rev. 243, 303 (2011) (“No . . . injury in fact is required when the government
undertakes a criminal prosecution, . . . and prosecutors may pursue generalized grievances on
behalf of the public.”); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Linkage Between Justiciability and Reme-
dies—and Their Connections to Substantive Rights, 92 Va. L. Rev. 633, 667 (2006) (“In [en-
forcement] suits by the government, courts characteristically make no inquiry into injury.”).
33. See Tachiona v. United States, 386 F.3d 205, 210–14 (2d Cir. 2004) (finding that
executive branch as nonparty intervenor had standing to appeal a default judgment entered
against a foreign private political party based on traditional standing analysis and the conclu-
sion that the executive branch had suffered a cognizable injury by virtue of the district court’s
decision); Tara Leigh Grove, Standing Outside of Article III, 162 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1311, 1319–32
(2014) (arguing that Article II sets requirements for standing with which the executive branch
must comply in addition to the standard Article III requirements for standing).
34. Thus, in Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433 (1939), the main opinions did not dispute
whether the plaintiff state legislators were obligated to establish standing at all, but rather
whether they had in fact established it. Compare id. at 446 (“[I]n the instant case . . . at least
the twenty senators whose votes, if their contention were sustained, would have been sufficient
to defeat the resolution ratifying the proposed constitutional amendment, have an interest in
the controversy which, treated by the state court as a basis for entertaining and deciding the
federal questions, is sufficient to give the Court jurisdiction to review that decision.”), with id.
at 464 (opinion of Frankfurter, J.) (“In the familiar language of jurisdiction, these Kansas
legislators must have standing in this Court. What is their distinctive claim to be here, not
possessed by every Kansan? What is it that they complain of, which could not be complained
of here by all their fellow citizens?”).
A separate question is whether a congressional party needs to satisfy the same standard
as, or a higher standard than, the typical litigant. Compare, e.g., Harrington v. Bush, 553 F.2d
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In Section I.A, I offer a brief overview of standing in general. Next, in
Section I.B, I canvass the Supreme Court’s take on congressional standing
(based on very few flirtations with it). I conclude with a critique of the
Supreme Court’s approach. Finally, in Section I.C, I survey the lower courts’
approaches, which have varied from far more welcoming to (in the after-
math of Raines) quite rigid. Section I.C concludes with a critique of the
lower courts’ takes on congressional standing in interbranch disputes.
A. Overview of Traditional Standing Jurisprudence
Standing limits the ability of plaintiffs to bring lawsuits in the federal
courts. Standing consists of two components. Its core, “constitutional stand-
ing,” emanates from Article III of the Constitution. In addition, other doc-
trines—some constitutional and some subconstitutional (or prudential)36—
further empower federal courts to decline to recognize the standing of cer-
tain plaintiffs to bring lawsuits against certain defendants in some
circumstances.
The Supreme Court has explained that “the law of Art. III standing is
built on a single basic idea—the idea of separation of powers.”37 The Court
has noted that, due to standing doctrine’s roots in notions of separation of
powers and limited judicial power, the Court’s “standing inquiry has been
especially rigorous when reaching the merits of the dispute would force us to
decide whether an action taken by one of the other two branches of the
Federal Government was unconstitutional.”38
190, 204 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (“The most basic point to consider is that there are no special stan-
dards for determining Congressional standing questions.”), with, e.g., Goldwater v. Carter, 617
F.2d 697, 710 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (Wright, C.J., concurring) (“[C]ourts could logically afford
legislators even less consideration on standing than they afford other citizens, since the legisla-
tor’s position gives him special access to the political process through which general constitu-
tional grievances should find redress.”), vacated on other grounds, 444 U.S. 996 (1979). I
address this question below. See infra text accompanying notes 98–108.
35. For the argument that Article I sets requirements for standing with which Congress
must comply (and similarly that Article II sets requirements for standing with which the exec-
utive branch must comply) in addition to the standard Article III requirements for standing,
see Grove, supra note 33, at 1314, and see also id. at 1353–65 (arguing that Article I furnishes
no basis for Congress to enforce or defend federal laws).
36. Unlike Article III standing, prudential standing is not grounded in the Constitution;
doctrines of prudential standing are generated by the courts, and Congress remains free to
revise and override them. See, e.g., Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 500–01 (1975).
37. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 752 (1984).
38. Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 819–20 (1997); see also Bender v. Williamsport Area
Sch. Dist., 475 U.S. 534, 541–42 (1986) (“Th[e] obligation to notice defects in a court of
appeals’ subject-matter jurisdiction assumes a special importance when a constitutional ques-
tion is presented. In such cases we have strictly adhered to the standing requirements to ensure
that our deliberations will have the benefit of adversary presentation and a full development of
the relevant facts.”); Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church &
State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 474 (1982) (“Proper regard for the complex nature of our constitu-
tional structure” means that a federal court should not “hospitably accept for adjudication
claims of constitutional violation by other branches of government where the claimant has not
suffered cognizable injury.”).
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The Court has made clear that constitutional standing requires three
showings by a plaintiff: (1) “injury in fact,” (2) a causal link between that
injury and the conduct complained of, and (3) redressability.39 The “injury
in fact” prong demands that the plaintiff show that he or she has suffered
“an invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particu-
larized, . . . and (b) ‘actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.’ ”40
Causation requires the plaintiff to establish that the injury is the result of the
action on the part of the defendant that is subject to challenge, and not the
result of independent action by a third party.41 Finally, the “redressability”
prong requires a plaintiff to show that it is “ ‘likely,’ as opposed to merely
‘speculative,’ that the injury will be ‘redressed by a favorable decision.’ ”42
From the plaintiff’s perspective, the “injury in fact” prong “drives the
standing analysis.”43 The plaintiff’s ability to pursue the lawsuit at all hinges
on whether the plaintiff can show that he or she has suffered an “injury in
fact.”44
39. E.g., Jonathan Remy Nash, Standing’s Expected Value, 111 Mich. L. Rev. 1283, 1304
(2013).
40. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992) (footnote omitted) (cita-
tions omitted) (quoting Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 155 (1990)).
41. Id. at 560–61.
42. Id. at 561 (quoting Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 38, 43 (1976)).
43. Nash, supra note 39, at 1304. On the other hand, the “causation” and “redressability”
prongs can be seen to ask whether the defendant (or defendants) has standing to defend the
lawsuit. See, e.g., Matthew I. Hall, Standing of Intervenor-Defendants in Public Law Litigation,
80 Fordham L. Rev. 1539, 1557 (2012); Joseph W. Mead, Interagency Litigation and Article III,
47 Ga. L. Rev. 1217, 1261–62 (2013).
44. Modern standing doctrine developed, from private law foundations, alongside the
expansion of the administrative state. See Cass R. Sunstein, Standing and the Privatization of
Public Law, 88 Colum. L. Rev. 1432, 1438–51 (1988). But see Elizabeth Magill, Standing for the
Public: A Lost History, 95 Va. L. Rev. 1131 (2009) (arguing that congressional freedom to
define standing by establishing causes of action dates to the eighteenth century); Ann Wool-
handler & Caleb Nelson, Does History Defeat Standing Doctrine?, 102 Mich. L. Rev. 689 (2004)
(arguing that eighteenth and nineteenth-century jurisprudence is not inconsistent with mod-
ern standing doctrine). Still, private common-law conceptions remained dominant as the nas-
cent administrative state ascended, with the result that the availability of judicial review often
turned on whether there was perceived to have been an intrusion on common-law rights and
interests. See Sunstein, supra, at 1438. Over time, however, Congress expanded the scope of
administrative structures and, as it did so, the number of people affected by regulation in-
creased. See id. at 1438–41. By the third quarter of the twentieth century, federal courts had
responded to this shift, see id. at 1441–44 (explaining the shift and the reasons for it), by
determining whether there was standing by looking to the Administrative Procedure Act, 5
U.S.C. § 702 (2012) (which itself codified some earlier judicial conceptions of standing, see
Sunstein, supra, at 1440). Under this approach, courts looked to see whether a plaintiff had
suffered a “legal wrong” or was “adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action.” 5 U.S.C.
§ 702 (“A person suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or adversely affected or
aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute, is entitled to judicial
review thereof.”).
In other words, the courts looked to the law to see how it defined a protected interest,
and then upheld standing when a legal injury had occurred. In a 1970 decision, however, the
Supreme Court abandoned this framework, see Ass’n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp,
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Other doctrines complement the core of Article III standing and create
barriers to standing. Among these complementary doctrines is one that is
quite relevant to the topic at hand: the “political-question doctrine.” That
doctrine renders “[a] controversy . . . nonjusticiable . . . where there is ‘a
textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordi-
nate political department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and managea-
ble standards for resolving it.’ ”45 Thus, under current doctrine,46 the courts
will determine whether the Constitution vests one of the political branches
with authority to resolve the issue and, if so, defer to that branch’s determi-
nation. Arguments invoking the political-question doctrine often arise in
interbranch disputes.
B. The Supreme Court’s (Limited) Forays into Congressional Standing
The Supreme Court has squarely addressed legislative standing—that is,
the standing of federal or state legislatures and legislators, of which congres-
sional standing is a subset—on only four occasions.47 Although the two
397 U.S. 150 (1970), and replaced the “legal interest test with a factual inquiry into the exis-
tence of harm,” Sunstein, supra, at 1445 (citing Data Processing, 397 U.S. at 153). The new
framework thus to some degree accommodated the public law model of litigation. At the same
time, however, the shift from a focus on legal to factual injury can be seen as a “respon[se] to a
belief that the private-law model no longer worked in public-law cases.” Id. at 1446; see Wil-
liam W. Buzbee, Standing and the Statutory Universe, 11 Duke Envtl. L. & Pol’y F. 247,
271–82 (2001) (arguing in favor of judicial deference to legislative definitions of harm and
standing); cf. Samuel Issacharoff, Private Claims, Aggregate Rights, 2008 Sup. Ct. Rev. 183
(arguing that the rule of civil procedure in cases other than class actions assumes a setting of
private litigation rather than litigation of aggregate rights).
Indeed, time would prove that the rejection of the private law model was not complete.
The final decades of the twentieth century saw Court decisions that reaffirmed standing doc-
trine’s reliance on traditional notions of common-law harm, in particular, ensconcing the
requirement of a traditional injury that is actual or imminent. See, e.g., Lujan, 504 U.S. at
560–67; Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750–53 (1984); Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org.,
426 U.S. 26, 38, 37–42 (1976); Linda R. S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 614–19 (1973). Some
have argued that the view that the common law should remain the paradigm for judicial
intervention underlies this approach. See, e.g., Sunstein, supra, at 1451–59. As such, if an in-
jury does not correspond well to an injury at common law, courts may be reluctant to recog-
nize standing.
At the end of the day, it seems that such a view of injury affords Congress too little
leeway in structuring rights of action under federal law. Nothing in Article III restricts Con-
gress to fashioning private rights of action in the nature of common-law rights. See William A.
Fletcher, The Structure of Standing, 98 Yale L.J. 221, 223–24 (1988); Nash, supra note 39, at
1312. Indeed, the courts’ shift away from a common-law paradigm implicitly recognizes this
point.
45. Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 228 (1993) (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S.
186, 217 (1962)).
46. For the argument that current political-question doctrine is quite different from its
historical understanding, see Tara Leigh Grove, The Long History of the Political Question Doc-
trine, 90 N.Y.U. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2015).
47. The Court has ducked the issue on various grounds—including that other parties
enjoyed standing, e.g., Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 721 (1986) (since private plaintiffs had
standing, “[w]e . . . need not consider the standing issue as to . . . [m]embers of Congress”),
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older cases seemed more open to legislative standing, the Court’s decision
that now holds sway is a 1997 case that suggested a much narrower view.
The reasoning of a 2015 decision upholding the standing of a state legisla-
ture would seem applicable to congressional standing, but the Court ex-
pressly stated there that its reasoning did not “touch or concern” the
question of congressional standing.48
The 1939 case Coleman v. Miller addressed the standing of Kansas state
legislators to challenge the role of the state lieutenant governor in ratifying a
proposed amendment to the U.S. Constitution.49 The forty-person Kansas
Senate divided over ratification 20–20, when the lieutenant governor—act-
ing in his capacity as the Senate’s presiding officer—cast the tiebreaking vote
in favor of ratification.50 After a majority of the state House voted in favor of
the amendment, twenty-one members of the Senate—including the twenty
members who had voted against the measure—and a few members of the
House filed suit against the Kansas secretary of state seeking an injunction
against certifying the ratification of the amendment.51 The state supreme
court denied the plaintiffs relief, and the U.S. Supreme Court granted
review.52
The Supreme Court affirmed the plaintiff legislators’ standing.53 First,
the Court noted that the state court below had recognized the plaintiffs’
and that the issue before the Court was moot, not yet ripe, or subject to the political-question
doctrine and therefore not justiciable, even assuming that constitutional standing existed, e.g.,
Burke v. Barnes, 479 U.S. 361, 364 n.* (1987) (mootness); Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996,
997–98 (1979) (Powell, J., concurring) (ripeness); id. at 1002 (Rehnquist, J., concurring) (po-
litical-question doctrine).
48. See Ariz. State Legislature v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 135 S. Ct. 2652,
2665 n.12 (2015).
49. 307 U.S. 433 (1939). The draft amendment, promulgated by Congress in 1924, was
known as the Child Labor Amendment. Coleman, 307 U.S. at 435. It would have empowered
Congress “to limit, regulate, and prohibit the labor of persons under eighteen years of age.”
H.R.J. Res. 184, 68th Cong., 1st Sess., 43 Stat. 670 (1924).
50. Coleman, 307 U.S. at 436.
51. Id. The lawsuit included officers of both houses of the legislature as defendants. Id.
52. Id. at 434.
53. The vote upholding standing was a close one:
Chief Justice Hughes wrote an opinion styled “the opinion of the Court.” Four Justices
concurred in the judgment, partially on the ground that the legislators lacked standing.
Two Justices dissented on the merits. Thus, even though there were only two Justices who
joined Chief Justice Hughes’ opinion on the merits, it is apparent that the two dissenting
Justices joined his opinion as to the standing discussion. Otherwise, Justice Frankfurter’s
opinion denying standing would have been the controlling opinion.
Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 822 n.5 (1997) (citations omitted) (quoting Coleman, 307 U.S. at
435). But see R. Lawrence Dessem, Congressional Standing to Sue: Whose Vote Is This, Anyway?,
62 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1, 4 (1986) (“Neither Chief Justice Hughes nor Justice Frankfurter
mustered a majority of the Court in support of their respective opinions.”); John Harrison,
Legislative Power, Executive Duty, and Legislative Lawsuits 7 & n.28 (Va. Pub. L. & Res. Series
Paper No. 2014-73, SSRN draft 2539135, 2014), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2539135 (“[T]he
seven Justices who voted to affirm did so on the grounds that the validity of ratification was a
political question to be decided by Congress. . . . Those seven Justices thus did not address the
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standing.54 Second, the Court emphasized that the controversy was excep-
tional; it was not the typical political dispute. The Court explained: “This is
not a mere intra-parliamentary controversy but the question relates to legis-
lative action deriving its force solely from the provisions of the Federal Con-
stitution, and the twenty senators were not only qualified to vote on the
question of ratification but their votes, if the Lieutenant Governor were ex-
cluded as not being a part of the legislature for that purpose, would have
been decisive in defeating the ratifying resolution.”55
The 1969 case Powell v. McCormack concerned a decision by the U.S.
House of Representatives to “exclude” Adam Clayton Powell, Jr., based on
allegations of corruption, from a congressional seat to which he was duly
elected.56 Powell and some of his constituents filed suit in federal court
against certain House members and officers.57 Although the Court did not
invoke the modern three-prong test for constitutional standing, it held both
that (1) the Declaratory Judgment Act made it possible for the federal courts
to fashion appropriate and effective relief,58 and (2) the political-question
doctrine did not preclude judicial intervention.59 It found the House’s failure
to pay Powell’s salary for a congressional session a sufficient basis for
standing.60
The 1987 case Raines v. Byrd61 is the Court’s most recent foray into the
question of congressional standing. Unlike in Coleman or Powell, the Court
in Raines found that there was no standing.62 Perhaps even more impor-
tantly, the Raines Court saw fit to suggest that the holdings in Coleman and
Powell should be read narrowly.63
validity of the Kansas ratification under Article V.”). Compare Ariz. State Legislature, 135 S. Ct.
at 2665 n.13 (maintaining that the decision in Coleman was rendered by a majority of Jus-
tices), with id. at 2696–97 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Coleman Court may have
split 4–4 on the question of standing).
54. Coleman, 307 U.S. at 437–38.
55. Id. at 441. Professor John Harrison argues that the Court’s decision in Coleman is
best read as recognizing legislative standing to call for the production of “a proper record of
legislative action” that the plaintiffs allege would have shown the impropriety of the lieutenant
governor’s purportedly tiebreaking vote. Harrison, supra note 53, at 6–7, 12–14 (quoting Cole-
man, 307 U.S. at 437); see id. at 7 (quoting Coleman, 307 U.S. at 438) (“That was the context
in which Chief Justice Hughes said that the plaintiffs complained that their votes had been
‘held for naught.’ ”).
56. 395 U.S. 486, 489–90 (1969).
57. Powell, 395 U.S. at 493.
58. See id. at 517–18.
59. Id. at 549.
60. Id. at 493–94, 499–500.
61. 521 U.S. 811 (1997).
62. Raines, 521 U.S. at 821–22, 830.
63. Id. at 821–26.
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Raines involved a constitutional challenge to the Line Item Veto Act by
members of Congress.64 That Act authorized the President “to ‘cancel’ cer-
tain spending and tax benefit measures” that were components of a bill he
had signed into law.”65 Plaintiffs—members of the Senate and House who
voted against the Act—sued two executive branch officials,66 arguing that the
Act unconstitutionally diluted their voting rights and altered the balance of
power between the legislative and executive branches.67
The Raines Court found that the plaintiffs did not have standing.68 In so
concluding, the Court read both Powell and Coleman—two cases in which
the Court had recognized legislative standing—narrowly.69 The Court read
Powell as applying only when the claimed injury was personal to the plain-
tiffs themselves,70 and it read Coleman as reaching, at most, claims of actual
vote nullification, that is, settings in which an affirmative legislative vote is
not given effect.71
The Raines Court highlighted three ways in which the alleged injury
suffered by the plaintiffs there was not attached to the particular plaintiffs
and thus not personal (unlike the injury suffered by Powell). First, the
Raines Court observed that any injury suffered by the plaintiffs was also
suffered by all the other members of Congress.72 Second, the Court eluci-
dated that any injury was not temporally attached to the particular plaintiffs
in Raines; rather, if a plaintiff retired from office, the injury, and the claim,
64. Id. at 814.
65. Id. (quoting Line Item Veto Act, Pub. L. No. 104-130, § 2(a), 110 Stat. 1200, 1200
(1996) (codified at 2 U.S.C. § 691(a)), invalidated by Clinton v. New York, 524 U.S. 417
(1998)). Specifically, the Line Item Veto Act provided:
[T]he President may, with respect to any bill or joint resolution that has been signed into
law pursuant to Article I, section 7, of the Constitution of the United States, cancel in
whole—(1) any dollar amount of discretionary budget authority; (2) any item of new
direct spending; or (3) any limited tax benefit; if the President—
(A) determines that such cancellation will—(i) reduce the Federal budget deficit;
(ii) not impair any essential Government functions; and (iii) not harm the national
interest; and
(B) notifies the Congress of such cancellation by transmitting a special message . . .
within five calendar days (excluding Sundays) after the enactment of the law [to
which the cancellation applies].
2 U.S.C. § 691(a) (some indentations omitted).
66. The executive branch officials were the Secretary of the Treasury and the Director of
the Office of Management and Budget. Raines, 521 U.S. at 814.
67. See id. at 816.
68. Id. at 830.
69. Id. at 821–26.
70. Id. at 820–21, 829.
71. Id. at 821–26.
72. Id. at 821 (“[The plaintiffs’] claim is that the Act causes a type of institutional injury
(the diminution of legislative power), which necessarily damages all Members of Congress and
both Houses of Congress equally.”).
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would pass to his or her successor.73 Third, the Court suggested that, to the
extent the legislators had suffered a diminishment in power, that power re-
ally belonged to the legislators’ constituents—and hence any injury was re-
ally suffered by them.74
The Raines Court identified Coleman as “[t]he one case in which we
have upheld standing for legislators . . . claiming an institutional injury.”75
While noting that the alleged injury suffered by the plaintiffs in Raines was
also institutional, Coleman was still of no avail. Coleman, the Raines Court
explained, “stands (at most . . . ) for the proposition that legislators whose
votes would have been sufficient to defeat (or enact) a specific legislative Act
have standing to sue if that legislative action goes into effect (or does not go
into effect), on the ground that their votes have been completely nullified.”76
In contrast, the votes of the plaintiffs in Raines “were given full effect”;77 the
plaintiffs “simply lost th[e] vote.”78 The Court further contrasted the alleged
vote nullification in Coleman with the Line Item Veto Act, which had “no
effect” on the legislative process.79 Going forward, “a majority of Senators
and Congressmen [could] pass or reject appropriations bills,”80 and could
“vote to repeal the Act, or to exempt a given appropriations bill (or a given
provision in an appropriations bill) from the Act.”81
While this reading of Coleman provided a narrow reed on which mem-
bers of Congress might rely for standing, the Court in a footnote suggested
an openness to even narrower readings that would make Coleman unavaila-
ble in suits brought in federal court,82 and in suits brought by federal (as
opposed to state) legislators.83 On the other hand, the Court suggested that
Coleman-like institutional standing could obtain—perhaps even on facts like
73. Id. (“If one of the [plaintiff] Members were to retire tomorrow, he would no longer
have a claim; the claim would be possessed by his successor instead.”).
74. See id. (“The claimed injury thus runs (in a sense) with the Member’s seat, a seat
which the Member holds (it may quite arguably be said) as trustee for his constituents, not as a
prerogative of personal power.”).
75. Id.
76. Id. at 823 (citation omitted).
77. Id. at 824.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. See id. at 824 n.8 (noting, without addressing, the argument that “Coleman has no
applicability to a similar suit brought in federal court, since that decision depended on the fact
that the Kansas Supreme Court ‘treated’ the senators’ interest in their votes ‘as a basis for
entertaining and deciding the federal questions’ ” (quoting Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 443,
446 (1939))).
83. See id. at 824–25 (noting, without addressing, the argument that “Coleman has no
applicability to a similar suit brought by federal legislators, since the separation-of-powers
concerns present in such a suit were not present in Coleman, and since any federalism con-
cerns were eliminated by the Kansas Supreme Court’s decision to take jurisdiction over the
case”).
December 2015] A Functional Theory of Congressional Standing 353
those in Raines—when (unlike in Raines itself) a house of Congress sup-
ported (or at least did not oppose) such a lawsuit.84 Finally, without com-
menting on whether these facts were relevant to its holding, the Court
observed that its conclusion “neither deprives Members of Congress of an
adequate remedy (since they may repeal the Act or exempt appropriations
bills from its reach), nor forecloses the Act from constitutional challenge (by
someone who suffers judicially cognizable injury as a result of the Act).”85
In its 2015 decision Arizona State Legislature v. Arizona Independent Re-
districting Commission, the Court returned to the issue of legislative stand-
ing.86 There, the Arizona state legislature challenged redistricting maps for
congressional and state legislative elections generated by an independent
state commission; the legislature argued that the delegation of redistricting
authority in the commission by statewide referendum violated the Constitu-
tion’s Elections Clause and federal statutory law.87 The Court held that the
reasoning of Coleman provided a basis for standing: the effect of the referen-
dum would “ ‘completely nullif[y]’ any vote by the Legislature, now or ‘in
the future,’ purporting to adopt a redistricting plan.”88 The Arizona State
Legislature Court distinguished Raines, explaining that, whereas standing
was absent in Raines when “six individual Members of Congress” brought
suit,89 in the case now at bar, “[t]he Arizona Legislature . . . is an institu-
tional plaintiff asserting an institutional injury, and it commenced [its] ac-
tion after authorizing votes in both of its chambers.”90
The Court took pains to explain that its recognition of legislative stand-
ing, and its validation of institutional imprimatur as a basis for distinguish-
ing Raines, did not lead inexorably to the conclusion that Congress, as an
institution, would have standing to sue the President. Rather, the Court
quoted the critical dicta from Raines that many have read to limit congres-
sional standing in explaining,
The case before us does not touch or concern the question whether Con-
gress has standing to bring a suit against the President. There is no federal
analogue to Arizona’s initiative power, and a suit between Congress and
the President would raise separation-of-powers concerns absent here. The
Court’s standing analysis, we have noted, has been “especially rigorous
84. See id. at 829 (“We attach some importance to the fact that [the legislators] have not
been authorized to represent their respective Houses of Congress in this action, and indeed
both Houses actively oppose their suit.”). Accepting the Raines Court’s dichotomy between
personal and institutional injuries, this consideration seems not to apply to settings of Powell-
like personal injury since there, the alleged injury will generally have been imposed by the
house of Congress itself.
85. Id. The Court explained: “Whether the case would be different if any of these circum-
stances were different we need not now decide.” Id. at 829–30.
86. 135 S. Ct. 2652, 2663–66 (2015).
87. Ariz. State Legislature, 135 S. Ct. at 2658–59 (first citing U.S. Const. art. I, § 4, cl. 1;
then citing 2 U.S.C. § 2a(c) (2012)).
88. Id. at 2665 (quoting Raines, 521 U.S. at 823–24).
89. Id. at 2664.
90. Id.
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when reaching the merits of the dispute would force [the Court] to decide
whether an action by one of the other two branches of the Federal Govern-
ment was unconstitutional.”91
* * *
The Raines opinion is problematic in several ways. Consider first the
Court’s distinction between “personal” injuries—such as the injury alleged
in the Powell case—and injuries that do not “single[ ] out” particular mem-
bers of Congress “for specially unfavorable treatment.”92 While the Raines
Court correctly reaffirmed the existence of standing in a case like Powell, its
attempt to juxtapose Powell as a case of personal injury with Raines as a case
of generalized injury is ambiguous, misleading, and stands in tension with
other portions of the Raines opinion. To begin, the Court’s juxtaposition
casts unnecessary doubt on the availability of standing when multiple mem-
bers of Congress share the injury. To the extent that the Court was trying to
draw on the accepted distinction in standing jurisprudence between person-
alized injuries (that support standing) and generalized grievances (that as a
rule do not93), the analogy is strained.94 While citizen standing and taxpayer
standing are generally unavailing on the ground that the injury is too imper-
sonal and generalized,95 there is no rule that a member of a class of similarly
situated persons or entities (short of all citizens or taxpayers) can only sue if
he or she suffers an injury distinct from others in the class. Thus, one voter
in a racially gerrymandered district can challenge the district lines, even
though other voters in the same district presumably could make identical
allegations.96 Moreover, the notion that an injury shared by multiple mem-
bers of Congress is less likely to support standing seems to contradict the
Raines Court’s assertion elsewhere that a lawsuit endorsed by an entire
house of Congress would be more likely to have adequate standing.97 After
all, that a house of Congress has endorsed a lawsuit suggests that (at least) a
majority of members share the alleged injury. Thus, the Raines opinion sug-
gested both that the claim of a lone member of Congress is more likely to
91. Id. at 2665 n.12 (quoting Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 819–20 (1997)).
92. Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 821 (1997).
93. See, e.g., Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 755–56 (1984) (rejecting an “abstract stig-
matic injury . . . [that] would extend nationwide to all members of the particular racial groups
against which the Government was alleged to be discriminating”).
94. See Note, Standing in the Way of Separation of Powers: The Consequences of Raines v.
Byrd, 112 Harv. L. Rev. 1741, 1747–49 (1999).
95. But see Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968) (taxpayer has standing to challenge a law
that authorizes the federal government to spend money allegedly in violation of the Establish-
ment Clause). Flast, however, has proven to be the exception to the rule. See Hein v. Freedom
From Religion Found., Inc., 551 U.S. 587, 608–09 (2007) (Alito, J.) (plurality opinion) (hold-
ing Flast to its facts and concluding that there is no taxpayer standing to challenge spending by
the executive branch on Establishment Clause grounds); id. at 618 (Scalia, J., concurring)
(urging that Flast should be overruled).
96. E.g., United States v. Hays, 515 U.S. 737, 744–45 (1995).
97. See Raines, 521 U.S. at 821, 829–30; supra note 84 and accompanying text.
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have standing than a claim shared by multiple members, but also (contradic-
torily) that a claim shared by multiple members is more likely to have stand-
ing than a claim shared by fewer members.
A second problem with the Raines opinion is that it can be taken to
suggest—albeit without clear justification—that standing requirements
should be applied more stringently in cases raising interbranch disputes.98
For one thing, the Court referred to the separation-of-powers underpin-
nings of Article III standing doctrine without specifying if that invocation
bore special meaning because of the interbranch nature of the conflict
before it.99 The Court noted that “our standing inquiry has been especially
rigorous when reaching the merits of the dispute would force us to decide
whether an action taken by one of the other two branches of the Federal
Government was unconstitutional.”100 Also consonant with this targeted un-
derstanding of separation-of-powers concerns is the Raines Court’s discus-
sion of the historical dearth of litigation over interbranch power disputes as
a ground for rejecting standing in Raines itself.101 Indeed, a leading treatise
on federal litigation practice sees Raines as “standing informed—and indeed
virtually controlled—by political-question concerns.”102 Some lower courts
have taken the Raines Court’s statement in just that way103—as the Supreme
Court seemed to in the Arizona State Legislature case104—and the Justice
Department has relied (to date unsuccessfully) on Raines to defend against
98. See, e.g., David J. Weiner, Note, The New Law of Legislative Standing, 54 Stan. L. Rev.
205, 220 (2001). Even prior to Raines, some commentators saw Supreme Court and D.C.
Circuit precedent as having created a “separate doctrine of ‘congressional standing.’ ” Dessem,
supra note 53, at 1–13; Carlin Meyer, Imbalance of Powers: Can Congressional Lawsuits Serve as
Counterweight?, 54 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 63, 71 (1992).
For discussion of the evolution of distinct standards for standing in various settings, and
critique of the practice, see generally Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Fragmentation of Standing, 93
Tex. L. Rev. 1061 (2015).
99. Raines, 521 U.S. at 819–20; cf. Heather Elliott, The Functions of Standing, 61 Stan. L.
Rev. 459, 465–501 (2008) (detailing how the Court’s standing cases vindicate various formula-
tions and aspects of the separation of powers).
100. Raines, 521 U.S. at 819–20. The Court proceeded to add:
In the light of this overriding and time-honored concern about keeping the Judiciary’s
power within its proper constitutional sphere, we must put aside the natural urge to
proceed directly to the merits of this important dispute and to “settle” it for the sake of
convenience and efficiency. Instead, we must carefully inquire as to whether appellees
have met their burden of establishing that their claimed injury is personal, particularized,
concrete, and otherwise judicially cognizable.
Id. at 820 (footnote omitted).
101. See id. at 826–28.
102. 13B Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 3531.
11.2 (3d ed. 2008).
103. See, e.g., Campbell v. Clinton, 203 F.3d 19, 20–21 (D.C. Cir. 2000); Chenoweth v.
Clinton, 181 F.3d 112, 116 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (“Raines . . . require[s] us to merge our separation
of powers and standing analyses.”). I discuss Chenoweth and Campbell below. See infra notes
141–142 and accompanying text.
104. See supra notes 86–91 and accompanying text.
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enforcement of congressional subpoena power directed against the executive
branch.105
Yet the conclusion that separation-of-powers concerns are, by virtue of
Raines, higher for interbranch disputes is far from clear. The Court’s state-
ment, that its standing inquiry is “especially rigorous” when facing an inter-
branch dispute, on its face refers broadly to cases in which the federal courts
are asked to adjudicate the constitutionality of actions taken by one of the
political branches.106 Nothing in the statement refers specifically to cases in-
volving a dispute between the two political branches. Indeed, the two cases
the Raines Court cited in support of that proposition—Bender v. Williams-
port Area School District107 and Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans
United for Separation of Church & State, Inc.108—involved not conflicts be-
tween the branches, but simply the question of whether acts of Congress
were constitutional.
The Court’s reliance on the historical dearth of interbranch litigation is
also problematic. The Court inferred from the historical absence of inter-
branch litigation a shared belief over time that standing to bring such suits
was not available.109 Yet other factors reasonably explain the phenomenon.
For one thing, the dearth of interbranch litigation could have been a func-
tion of a (relative) dearth of interbranch conflict, and the increase in such
litigation a function of increased assertions of power by one branch to the
alleged detriment of another.110
Moreover, a decision not to resort to judicial resolution of a conflict
may be a function not of the shared belief over time that the courts lack the
power to resolve the dispute, but rather a belief that the political costs of a
lawsuit outweigh the benefits. Political costs may be associated with the very
notion of invoking a court’s jurisdiction to resolve an interbranch conflict.
Professor Josh Chafetz argues that subjecting the determination of a
branch’s relative power to judicial review imprudently would concede that
105. See supra notes 6–7 and accompanying text.
106. Raines, 521 U.S. at 819–20.
107. 475 U.S. 534, 536–38, 542 (1986).
108. 454 U.S. 464, 468–69, 473–74 (1982).
109. The flaw in this reasoning is similar to flaws that courts and commentators point out
in relying on an absence of a particular statement or sentiment in legislative history. See, e.g.,
Harrison v. PPG Indus., Inc., 446 U.S. 578, 592 (1980) (noting, in the context of rejecting such
a legislative history argument, that, “[i]n ascertaining the meaning of a statute, a court cannot,
in the manner of Sherlock Holmes, pursue the theory of the dog that did not bark”). I am
grateful to Alexander Volokh for this point.
110. Cf. NLRB v. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550, 2604 (2014) (Scalia, J., concurring in the
judgment) (noting the increased assertion of executive power, in the form of reliance on recess
appointments, during recent presidential administrations in response to a single Attorney
General’s legal opinion); Neal Kumar Katyal, Internal Separation of Powers: Checking Today’s
Most Dangerous Branch from Within, 115 Yale L.J. 2314, 2322 n.21 (2006) (describing how
several years of severely divided government has led to “a massive increase in executive
power”).
December 2015] A Functional Theory of Congressional Standing 357
that branch’s power is subservient to the judiciary (another branch of gov-
ernment).111 This reluctance to submit to a judicial referee may be especially
heightened for the President, and may explain why the Court could identify
far more historic opportunities (not taken) for the President to sue Congress
than for Congress to sue the President. The absence of congressional law-
suits may also be explained by Professor Aziz Huq’s argument that one
might reasonably expect federal judges to be predisposed toward the inter-
ests of the President, owing to both the President’s appointment power and
the judiciary’s reliance on the executive to enforce its judgments.112
Also, a branch may find it costly to actually move forward with a lawsuit
against a coordinate branch.113 Indeed, it took months after the House au-
thorized filing a lawsuit against President Obama and his administration for
the suit to be filed.114 The House had substantial problems retaining coun-
sel,115 and political opponents  of the House leadership used the machina-
tions over the lawsuit as an argument (rightly or wrongly) that the suit
would merely be a precursor to full-fledged impeachment proceedings, thus
painting the House leadership as extreme.116
Moreover, whatever obstacles an individual lawmaker pondering a law-
suit faces, the difficulties surely multiply once lawmakers try to assemble a
larger bloc of plaintiffs or institutional imprimatur—that is, the official ap-
proval of the congressional house in which they sit—to proceed. Convincing
one legislator that the benefits of suit outweigh the costs may be difficult,
but it will probably be more difficult still to convince more legislators of the
same. Thus, if legislators historically had the impression that a suit against
111. See Chafetz, supra note 7, at 1152–53.
112. Professor Aziz Huq argues that federal judges will be inclined toward the President’s
interests both (1) because of the President’s appointment powers, and (2) because the federal
judiciary relies on the executive branch for enforcement of its orders. See Aziz Z. Huq, The
Negotiated Structural Constitution, 146 Colum. L. Rev. 1595, 1678–79 (2014).
113. Political costs for an individual legislator will be much lower. Indeed, an individual
legislator might think that the gains he or she would gain from the “position taking” inherent
in a lawsuit outweigh the costs. See David R. Mayhew, Congress: The Electoral Connec-
tion 61–62 (2d ed. 1974) (describing the incentive of members of Congress to “position
take”). I am grateful to Aziz Huq for this point. This intuition is consistent with the fact that,
while there has been a dearth of lawsuits by Congress or houses of Congress against the execu-
tive branch, there have been lawsuits filed by smaller collections of individual lawmakers.
114. Indeed, had the House waited another six weeks, it is arguable that the authority to
file suit would have expired along with the Congress that generated it. See Comm. on the
Judiciary v. Miers, 542 F.3d 909, 911 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (“[O]n January 3, 2009[,] . . . the 110th
House of Representatives will cease to exist as a legal entity, and the subpoenas it has issued
will expire.”).
115. Jacob Gershman, Boehner v. Obama Lawsuit in Limbo After Another Law Firm Drops
Out, Wall St. J.: Law Blog (Oct. 30, 2014, 11:47 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2014/10/30/
boehner-v-obama-lawsuit-in-limbo-after-another-law-firm-drops-out/.
116. See, e.g., Alan Fram, House Approves Lawsuit Against Obama, The Rundown, PBS
Newshour (July 30, 2014, 6:46 PM), http://www.pbs.org/newshour/rundown/house-ap-
proves-lawsuit-obama/ (“In their latest appeal, House Democrats emailed a fundraising solici-
tation . . . saying, ‘Republicans have said this lawsuit has “opened the door” to
impeachment.’ ”).
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the President would more likely be successful if it were joined by numerous
legislators—a point borne out by dicta (at the least) in Raines that the stand-
ing inquiry might have come out differently had the lawsuit there received
institutional imprimatur117—then a historical absence of interbranch litiga-
tion becomes even easier to understand.
A third problem with the Raines opinion is that it erroneously, if implic-
itly, assumes that the only constitutional function of Congress is voting. As I
discuss below, that ignores the important congressional role in gathering
information in order to legislate effectively—a function that the Court itself
has previously recognized.118 Moreover, even the Court’s discussion of vot-
ing itself is stingy: the Court suggests that the casting of actual votes is the
totality of congressional function, ignoring that the requirement that a vote
in Congress be taken creates an important power in Congress, even if no
actual vote is ever taken.119 Put another way, congressional prerogative to
conduct votes is itself a congressional power.
C. The Lower Courts and Congressional Standing
For their part, the lower courts have sometimes been more receptive to,
but have also greatly struggled with, issues of congressional standing. The
issue has arisen (not surprisingly) most frequently before the U.S. District
Court for the District of Columbia and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit. The D.C. Circuit has identified different bases
for and limitations on congressional standing over time, varying its ap-
proach under common-law reasoning and as it has perceived Supreme
Court precedent to require it.120
Congressional standing first became a pressing issue before the court in
the 1970s. Early on, the D.C. Circuit suggested that a member of Congress
had standing to obtain a legal determination that would (if successful) “bear
upon” the plaintiff’s “duties” as a legislator.121 The court abandoned this
basis for standing soon thereafter, however, citing a spate of Supreme Court
decisions in the 1970s that refined the law of standing and rendered the
“bear upon” standard legally obsolete.122
117. See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
118. See infra notes 156–158 and accompanying text.
119. See infra notes 156–159 and accompanying text.
120. For a detailed survey of the D.C. Circuit case law, see Anthony Clark Arend & Cathe-
rine B. Lotrionte, Congress Goes to Court: The Past, Present, and Future of Legislator Standing,
25 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 209 (2001).
121. Mitchell v. Laird, 498 F.2d 611, 614 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (“If we, for the moment, assume
that defendants’ actions in continuing the hostilities in Indo-China were or are beyond the
authority conferred upon them by the Constitution, a declaration to that effect would bear
upon the duties of plaintiffs to consider whether to impeach defendants, and upon plaintiffs’
quite distinct and different duties to make appropriations to support the hostilities, or to take
other legislative actions related to such hostilities, such as raising an army or enacting other
civil or criminal legislation. In our view, these considerations are sufficient to give plaintiffs a
standing to make their complaint.”).
122. See Harrington v. Bush, 553 F.2d 190, 207–09 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
December 2015] A Functional Theory of Congressional Standing 359
In the meantime, the D.C. Circuit endorsed a narrower version of con-
gressional standing. In 1974, the court in Kennedy v. Sampson123 relied on
Coleman to conclude that (1) the Senate had standing to allege that action
by the President impaired its lawmaking function,124 and (2) an individual
senator enjoyed derivative standing based on the alleged resulting impair-
ment of the effectiveness of his vote.125
By 1981, the court confronted the confusion sewn by its existing ap-
proach to congressional standing—and, in particular, the notion that con-
gressional plaintiffs ought to face no more hurdles than other plaintiffs—
and the conflicting notion that “this court will not confer standing on a
congressional plaintiff unless he is suffering an injury that his colleagues
cannot redress.”126 Deciding that separation-of-powers concerns were “best
addressed independently” of the congressional standing issue,127 the court of
appeals decided to instead deploy the possibility of abstention under the
court’s equitable discretion.128 The court engrafted the abstention doctrine
onto the existing standard for standing. Thus, even when standing would
otherwise inhere, “[w]here a congressional plaintiff could obtain substantial
relief from his fellow legislators through the enactment, repeal, or amend-
ment of a statute, this court should exercise its equitable discretion to dis-
miss the legislator’s action.”129
Panels of the court sometimes questioned the appropriateness of equita-
ble discretion.130 Additionally, Antonin Scalia and Robert Bork—then both
judges on the court—leveled strong criticism against the practice of absten-
tion based on equitable discretion, and more generally the court’s openness
to the standing of members of Congress to raise challenges to executive
123. 511 F.2d 430 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
124. See Kennedy, 511 F.2d at 434. Indeed, the executive branch defendants conceded this
point. Id. at 435.
125. See id. at 436 (noting that the plaintiff’s claim “is derivative, but . . . is nonetheless
substantial”); accord Goldwater v. Carter, 617 F.2d 697, 702 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (finding that
individual Senators had standing to challenge the President’s decision to terminate a treaty
without a vote of the Senate, reasoning that “[t]he President has thus [allegedly] nullified the
right that each appellee Senator claims under the Constitution to be able to block the termina-
tion of this treaty by voting, in conjunction with one-third of his colleagues, against it”),
vacated on other grounds, 444 U.S. 996 (1979).
126. See Riegle v. Fed. Open Mkt. Comm., 656 F.2d 873, 877 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (“We be-
lieve that these two contradictory principles create unnecessary confusion when applied to
suits brought by congressional plaintiffs.”).
127. Id. at 879.
128. Id. at 881. When a court abstains, it has the power to hear the case but chooses not to
exercise that power. Jonathan Remy Nash, On the Efficient Deployment of Rules and Standards
to Define Federal Jurisdiction, 65 Vand. L. Rev. 509, 525 (2012).
129. Riegle, 656 F.2d at 881.
130. E.g., Humphrey v. Baker, 848 F.2d 211, 214 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (concerns about the
doctrine of equitable discretion “continue to trouble us”); Melcher v. Fed. Open Mkt. Comm.,
836 F.2d 561, 565 n.4 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (expressing doubt as to continuing viability of
doctrine).
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power at all.131 Nonetheless, the essential approach—asking whether a con-
gressional plaintiff suffered an impairment of duties, and then, if so,
whether the court nevertheless should exercise its equitable discretion and
abstain—essentially persisted until the Supreme Court handed down its
1987 decision in Raines.
In the wake of Raines, the D.C. Circuit hedged as to whether its prior
approach to congressional standing survived. In the 1999 case Chenoweth v.
Clinton, members of Congress challenged the President’s ability to set up a
program by executive order (without a direct statutory basis).132 The court
dismissed the action. The court specifically noted that “[a]pplying [pre-
Raines circuit precedent], this court presumably would have found th[e] in-
jury sufficient to satisfy the standing requirement; after Raines, however, we
cannot.”133 Yet, at the same time, the court went to the trouble of explaining
that some portion of the circuit’s pre-Raines precedent “may remain good
law,” but that even under that remaining precedent the plaintiffs could not
proceed with their case.134 According to the panel, equitable discretion
would have required the court to dismiss the case “[b]ecause the parties’
dispute is . . . fully susceptible to political resolution.”135 And, while
narrower circuit precedent on standing—specifically the Kennedy case—
131. Moore v. U.S. House of Reps., 733 F.2d 946, 957, 962 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Scalia, J.,
concurring) (“[A] purely intragovernmental dispute . . . has no place in the law courts.”);
Barnes v. Kline, 759 F.2d 21, 41, 61 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Bork, J., dissenting) (“We ought to
renounce outright the whole notion of congressional standing [where the dispute is between
the Congress and the President].”), vacated on other grounds sub nom. Burke v. Barnes, 479
U.S. 361 (1987).
132. 181 F.3d 112, 112–13 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (discussing President Clinton’s creation of the
American Heritage Rivers Initiative by executive order after Congress failed to enact it
legislatively).
133. Chenoweth, 181 F.3d at 116. Specifically, the plaintiffs in Chenoweth relied on the
court of appeals’s decision in Moore v. House of Representatives, 733 F.2d 946 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
There, the court upheld the standing of the House of Representatives to challenge the origina-
tion of a revenue bill in the Senate, although it then proceeded to dismiss the case in its
equitable discretion. Id. at 948. On the standing point, the court explained that the injury
alleged in Raines “was only a minor variation on the injury asserted in Moore, where the
beneficiary of the alleged change in the constitutional order was the Senate rather than the
President. More to the point, it is exactly the position taken by the Representatives here.”
Chenoweth, 181 F.3d at 116.
134. Chenoweth, 181 F.3d at 116–17.
135. Id. The court elucidated:
Whatever Moore gives the Representatives under the rubric of standing, it takes away as a
matter of equitable discretion. It is uncontested that the Congress could terminate the
AHRI were a sufficient number in each House so inclined. Because the parties’ dispute is
therefore fully susceptible to political resolution, we would, applying Moore, dismiss the
complaint to avoid “meddl[ing] in the internal affairs of the legislative branch.” Applying
Raines, we would reach the same conclusion. Raines, therefore, may not overrule Moore
so much as require us to merge our separation of powers and standing analyses. In citing
Moore, of course, the Representatives are not asking us to do that; instead, they would
have us simply ignore half of that opinion.
Id. (alteration in original) (citation omitted) (quoting Moore, 733 F.2d at 956).
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might fall within Raines’s vote-nullification basis for standing,136 the
plaintiffs
do not allege that the necessary majorities in the Congress voted to block
the [executive branch program in question]. Unlike the plaintiffs in Ken-
nedy and Coleman, therefore, they cannot claim their votes were effectively
nullified by the machinations of the Executive. Consequently, even if Ken-
nedy is still viable after Raines, it cannot bear the weight the Representa-
tives would place on it.137
Subsequent cases have taken Raines even further. In the 2000 case
Campbell v. Clinton, the D.C. Circuit rejected allegations of vote nullification
arising out of votes on conducting air strikes in the former Yugoslavia.138
There, Congress had “voted down a declaration of war 427 to 2 and an
‘authorization’ of the air strikes [by a tie vote of] 213 to 213, but it also
[had] voted against requiring the President to immediately end U.S. partici-
pation in the NATO operation and voted to fund that involvement.”139
Plaintiffs, members of the House, “by specifically defeating the War Powers
Resolution authorization by a tie vote and by defeating a declaration of war,
sought to fit within the Coleman [vote nullification] exception to the Raines
rule.”140 The court of appeals rejected this argument, reaffirming that, since
the plaintiffs had recourse to political relief, judicial relief would be unavail-
able (whether under Raines or under pre-Raines circuit precedent).141 The
court noted that Congress remained free to pass a law forbidding the use of
U.S. forces in Yugoslavia, to cut funding for undertaking, or to resort to
impeachment “should a President act in disregard of Congress’ authority on
these matters.”142
* * *
Perhaps the greatest challenge for the lower courts—and the issue that
has been subject to the most flux over the years—has been how to incorpo-
rate separation-of-powers concerns into the standing inquiry. The shifting
approaches taken by the D.C. Circuit over the years reflect the difficulty this
has posed. The D.C. Circuit’s position in the early 1970s flouted the Su-
preme Court’s then-evolving test for standing143 by not calling for a congres-
sional plaintiff to establish an injury in fact, and therefore also ignored
136. Id. (“As for Kennedy, it may survive as a peculiar application of the narrow rule
announced in Coleman v. Miller.” (citation omitted)).
137. Id. at 117.
138. 203 F.3d 19, 23 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
139. Campbell, 203 F.3d at 20.
140. Id. at 22.
141. See id. at 21–23.
142. Id. at 23.
143. See Heather Elliott, The Structure of Standing at 25: Introduction to the Symposium,
65 Ala. L. Rev. 269, 269 (2013) (“The injury-in-fact requirement had emerged by the early
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standing’s separation-of-powers underpinnings.144 The D.C. Circuit soon
constricted congressional standing in light of separation-of-powers
concerns.145
But when more recent Supreme Court precedent suggested that the D.C.
Circuit approach was insufficiently mindful of separation of powers, the
D.C. Circuit opted not to further constrain the scope of congressional stand-
ing. Rather, the court chose to deploy equitable discretion146 to allow for the
dismissal of cases (despite the existence of standing under the circuit’s gov-
erning standard) based on one particular separation-of-powers concern. Spe-
cifically, equitable discretion would be invoked when legislators, through the
access to the political process they enjoy by virtue of their status as legisla-
tors, could reasonably remedy the alleged injury. This innovation validated
to some degree the notion that legislators should enjoy less access to the
courts than average citizens.147
Raines forced the D.C. Circuit again to reexamine its test for congres-
sional standing. The court in Chenoweth read Raines to “require us to merge
our separation of powers and standing analyses.”148 In other words, going
forward, the D.C. Circuit would include what had been the focus of equita-
ble discretion—whether the legislative plaintiffs had political means to rec-
tify their alleged injury at their disposal—as part of the core standing
inquiry. In so doing, the court of appeals read Raines to call for a more
stringent standing inquiry in cases of interbranch dispute. Indeed, other
lower courts similarly have read Raines to call for a more rigorous standing
inquiry in cases involving a dispute between branches of the federal
government.149
The D.C. Circuit narrowed congressional standing further still in Camp-
bell. There, the court suggested that impeachment was a viable option for
members of Congress to use as an avenue to remedy their injury,150 or, in
1970s, as had aspects of the traceability and redressability requirements, but the Court did not
state the test as a tripartite requirement until the 1980s.” (footnotes omitted)).
144. See supra notes 121–129 and accompanying text.
145. See supra notes 132–134 and accompanying text.
146. See supra notes 135–139 and accompanying text.
147. See supra text accompanying note 135.
148. Chenoweth v. Clinton, 181 F.3d 112, 116 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
149. See, e.g., Kerr v. Hickenlooper, 744 F.3d 1156, 1168 (10th Cir. 2014) (“[B]ecause the
present suit deals with the relationship between a state legislature and its citizenry, we are not
presented with the separation-of-powers concerns that were present in Raines.”). But see Baird
v. Norton, 266 F.3d 408, 412–13 (6th Cir. 2001) (noting, in dismissing lawsuit on standing
grounds brought by lone state representative and lone federal representative, that, had the
lawsuit been joined by other state representatives “whose total votes (and non-votes) would
have been sufficient to defeat the necessary legislation, then this group of lawmakers . . . would
have had standing as legislators based on vote nullification”).
150. Campbell v. Clinton, 203 F.3d 19 (D.C. Cir. 2000); see also supra text accompanying
note 142.
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other words, that the availability of impeachment might render plaintiff leg-
islators’ claims nonjusticiable.151 Since impeachment is technically always
available (even if it politically almost never is), such a rule (at least if taken
to an extreme) would render standing virtually unavailable for any claims by
federal legislators.
At the end of the day, it is not clear that the particular separation-of-
powers concern introduced initially via equitable discretion—and now
“merged into” the D.C. Circuit’s actual standing analysis—even belongs as
part of the standing inquiry. The issue of whether plaintiff legislators have
an avenue to political relief for their injury seems more a part of the politi-
cal-question doctrine than standing.152 Yet the political-question doctrine is
quite distinct from core Article III standing.153 Indeed, the political-question
doctrine may render a case nonjusticiable for which standing otherwise ex-
ists under Article III.154 That being the case, it seems that the D.C. Circuit
errs in folding political question concerns into the core Article III standing
inquiry.
II. The Functions of Congress
In this Part, I explore the various functions of Congress and its mem-
bers. It is surely true that the foundational action that a member of Congress
can take is to vote on pending legislation. But it is also true that casting votes
is not the sum total of what Congress does. Undertaking legislation requires
Congress to not only cast votes, but also to craft bills and conduct negotia-
tions over their structure and content—both internally and externally with
the executive branch. Moreover, in order to legislate effectively—and to
gauge the need for new legislation and the effectiveness of existing legisla-
tion—it falls within Congress’s purview to gather information. Indeed, the
Supreme Court has long recognized the importance of Congress as a gath-
erer of information.155 Beyond that, confining one’s understanding of Con-
gress’s role to actual voting masks the power that inures to Congress by
virtue of the requirement that votes be taken in the first place. That power—
which we refer to as “process bargaining power”—may manifest itself even
when no vote is actually taken.
First, the restriction in Raines of institutional injury to cases that impli-
cate voting (let alone the narrow context of actual vote nullification) errone-
ously presupposes that Congress’s only institutional role is to collect votes,
and therefore that injury occurs only when voting is impaired. Consider the
151. See Enforcing the President’s Constitutional Duty to Faithfully Execute the Laws: Hear-
ing Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 113th Cong. 88 (2014) (statement of Elizabeth Price
Foley, Professor of Law, Florida International University, College of Law) (“[T]he Campbell
majority believed that any legislative remedy—even impeachment—would foreclose legislator
standing.”).
152. See id. at 23–25.
153. See supra text accompanying notes 39–46.
154. See supra note 47.
155. See McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135, 161 (1927).
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well-accepted constitutional role of Congress in conducting hearings. While
the Constitution does not expressly identify this as a core congressional
function,156 the Court nonetheless has readily recognized that “[i]n actual
legislative practice power to secure needed information by . . . means [of
compelling testimony of witnesses before investigative committees] has long
been treated as an attribute of the power to legislate.”157 Indeed, “the power
of inquiry—with process to enforce it—is an essential and appropriate aux-
iliary to the legislative function.”158
Congress’s power to hold hearings and gather information is effectively
a subset of its oversight power.159 The practice dates back to the early days of
the Republic.160 More recent decades have seen it soundly ensconced in
statutory law.161 Like the general power to hold hearings, overseeing the
156. Id. (“[T]here is no provision expressly investing either house with power to make
investigations and exact testimony to the end that it may exercise its legislative function advis-
edly and effectively.”).
157. Id. The McGrain Court further elucidated that this power was recognized “in the
British Parliament and in the Colonial legislatures before the American Revolution; and a like
view has prevailed and been carried into effect in both houses of Congress and in most of the
state legislatures.” Id.
158. Id. at 174.
159. See Craig Martin, Taking War Seriously: A Model for Constitutional Constraints on the
Use of Force in Compliance with International Law, 76 Brook. L. Rev. 611, 681 (2011) (“In
addition to passing legislation, the legislature in virtually all liberal democracies, whether par-
liamentary or presidential in structure, performs the core functions of representation, over-
sight, and control over government expenditure.”).
160. William P. Marshall, The Limits on Congress’s Authority to Investigate the President,
2004 U. Ill. L. Rev. 781, 785–88 (documenting early experience); see also Gerald Gamm &
Kenneth Shepsle, Emergence of Legislative Institutions: Standing Committees in the House and
Senate, 1810–1825, 14 Legis. Stud. Q. 39, 43–57 (1989) (discussing how standing committees
arose early in the Republic, helping Congress to obtain and process the large amounts of
information it needed to enact legislation). See generally Keith Krehbiel, Information and
Legislative Organization 105–50 (1991) (arguing that obtaining and organizing informa-
tion, and not political parties and affiliations, motivate the creation and staffing of committees
in Congress); Congress Investigates: A Documented History 1792–1974 (Arthur M.
Schlesinger, Jr. & Roger Bruns eds., 1975) (collecting episodes and documents from the coun-
try’s first 200 years).
161. See, e.g., GPRA Modernization Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-352, § 2, 124 Stat. 3866,
3867 (2011) (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. § 306(d)) (mandating that when developing or
adjusting a strategic plan, agencies consult with Congress at least once every two years); Legis-
lative Reorganization Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-510, § 118, 84 Stat. 1140, 1156 (codified as
amended at 2 U.S.C. § 190d(a) (2012)) (authorizing House and Senate standing committees to
“review and study, on a continuing basis, the application, administration, and execution” of
laws in that committee’s subject area).
Congress also conducts information gathering through the auspices of the Government
Accountability Office (GAO). Established in 1921, the GAO (originally called the General Ac-
counting Office) is a government agency independent of the executive branch. See 31 U.S.C.
§ 702(a) (2012) & hist. n.; The History of GAO - GAO’s Start, U.S. Gov’t Accountability
Office, http://www.gao.gov/about/history/ (last visited Aug. 27, 2015). It is headed by the U.S.
Comptroller General, who is appointed—from a list of at least three names generated by a
bipartisan panel—by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate for a fifteen-year
term. 31 U.S.C. §§ 702(b), 703(a)–(b) (2012). Statutes authorize the Comptroller General to
report on, monitor, and audit executive agencies. Id. §§ 712, 713(a); id. § 717(b)(2)–(3).
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executive improves Congress’s ability to legislative effectively.162 It thus is not
uncommon to see Congress enact legislation that directs the executive
branch to provide information to Congress on some regular basis,163 or to
hold hearings at which executive branch officials testify or hearings in re-
sponse to which the executive branch provides information—sometimes
subject to congressional subpoenas.164
Second, while the Court’s framework in Raines did acknowledge voting
as a central congressional function, its understanding of the importance of
voting was far too limited. The Court recognized, properly, that Congress
votes for bills which, on the President’s signature (or an override of the
President’s veto), become law; and that a congressional vote against a bill
prevents that bill from becoming law. At the same time, the Court failed to
recognize how Congress’s role in the constitutional lawmaking scheme is
itself a pivotal congressional function.
The Constitution assigns Congress specific roles in the lawmaking pro-
cess. Most prominent are the requirements for a bill to become a law: bicam-
eralism (both houses of Congress vote for the bill) and presentment (the
approved bill must be sent to the President for either signature or veto). The
For an overview of the law governing legislative oversight proceedings, see generally
Morton Rosenberg, Investigative Oversight: An Introduction to the Law, Practice
and Procedure of Congressional Inquiry (2003).
162. E.g., Marshall, supra note 160, at 781 (“Congressional investigations of the President
. . . inform Congress so that it may take appropriate legislative action.”); id. at 782–83
(“[C]ongressional investigations provide access to the information that is necessary for Con-
gress to fulfill its own duties. The executive branch . . . is the ‘the repository of the country’s
most important information for public policy formulation,’ and Congress’s dependence upon
the Executive to provide that information will only increase as social and economic issues
become ever more complex.” (quoting Patricia M. Wald & Jonathan R. Siegel, The D.C. Circuit
and the Struggle for Control of Presidential Information, 90 Geo. L.J. 737, 739 (2002))).
To be sure, oversight reviews of the executive branch also may offer benefits that hearings
in general may not: They “inform the public so that it may be aware of the workings of
government,” id. at 781–82, and “provide a check against corruption or abuse of power in the
executive branch,” id. at 782.
163. See, e.g., 3 U.S.C. § 108(b) (2012) (“The President shall transmit a report to each
House of the Congress for each fiscal year beginning on or after the effective date of this
subsection which sets forth the purposes for which expenditures were made under this section
for such fiscal year and the amount expended for each such purpose.”).
164. See, e.g., Senate Select Comm. on Presidential Campaign Activities v. Nixon, 498 F.2d
725 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
Conflict between the legislature and executive branch may erupt over a congressional
subpoena even where the executive branch is not the target of the subpoena. In United States v.
American Telephone & Telegraph Co., 567 F.2d 121, 123 (D.C. Cir. 1977), a committee of the
House of Representatives conducting an investigation subpoenaed documents from AT&T.
Concerned that production of the documents would endanger national security, the executive
branch sought an injunction precluding AT&T from complying with the subpoena. Id. at
122–24. The House of Representatives intervened; the actual conflict, then, was between the
House and the executive branch. Id. The D.C. Circuit held that the interbranch nature of the
dispute was justiciable. Id. at 126–27 (“The simple fact of a conflict between the legislative and
executive branches over a congressional subpoena does not preclude judicial resolution.”).
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Supreme Court has explained that the “clear[ ] . . . prescription for legisla-
tive action” in the Constitution means that federal legislative power must be
“exercised in accord with a single, finely wrought and exhaustively consid-
ered, procedure.”165
While bicameralism is the norm for federal legislative function, some
constitutional provisions for the exercise of legislative power do not involve
bicameralism. For example, Senate approval alone is required for appoint-
ment of federal judges and officers.166 Other provisions do not require pre-
sentment—for example, approval of a constitutional amendment entails
approval by two-thirds of each house of Congress but no presidential in-
volvement.167 Still, the fact remains that these requirements, like the require-
ments for making a bill into a law, provide a “single” path for reaching the
result in question. And each of these single paths provides for a particular,
and mandatory, legislative role.
That Congress has a mandatory role in a path to a particular result
clearly makes it important how Congress (or the relevant house of Congress,
as the case may be) votes on a proposal properly before it. What is less
obvious is that that mandatory role affects the process even when no vote is
taken. That a particular congressional vote is a prerequisite under a path to a
particular result means that the other actors empowered along that path
should, if they act rationally, take into account the need for that vote in
structuring their own strategies. The ability of a group of legislators to allow
or prevent a result, based on how it votes, affords that group “process bar-
gaining power.” That power may affect the proposal that comes before the
house of Congress for a vote before any vote is actually taken. The mere
threat of a vote casts a shadow that affects the very structure of the legal
165. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 951, 952–55, 959 (1983) (invoking the point in the
course of invalidating legislation that attempted to create a “legislative veto” under which one
house of Congress was authorized to invalidate a decision by the executive branch not to
deport an alien); see also Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 421, 439–40 (1998)
(invoking the point in the context of invalidating the Line Item Veto Act).
166. U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. Other examples include the Senate’s prerogative to
approve (by a vote of two-thirds, and without a vote by the House) of treaties proposed by the
President, id.; the House’s power (without the Senate) to initiate impeachments, id. art. I, § 2,
cl. 5; and the Senate’s power (by a vote of two-thirds, and without the House) to try impeach-
ments, id. art. I, § 3, cl. 6. For discussion, see Chadha, 462 U.S. at 955–56, 956 n.21 (noting
that one also might choose to include as an exception to bicameralism and presentment each
House’s prerogative to set its own rules to “determin[e] specified internal matters,” but also
noting that “this ‘exception’ only empowers Congress to bind itself” (citing U.S. Const. art. I,
§ 7, cls. 2, 3, § 5, cl. 2)).
167. U.S. Const. art. V; see also Chadha, 462 U.S. at 955 n.21 (“An exception from the
Presentment Clauses was ratified in Hollingsworth v. Virginia, 3 Dall. 378 (1798). There the
Court held Presidential approval was unnecessary for a proposed constitutional amendment
. . . .”). An amendment can also proceed without any congressional approval on promulgation
by a constitutional convention. The President has no role in this process either. U.S. Const.
art. V.
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proposal that comes before Congress in the first place.168 Put another way, if
congressional passage were optional, the casting of votes would mean little as
a core function; thus, the necessity of casting votes becomes a core function
in and of itself. Congress exerts power even when a bill is voted down, or
indeed even when no vote is ever taken.
Having now elucidated the various functions of Congress within the
U.S. constitutional system, I turn in Part III to extracting valid bases for
congressional standing from these functions.
III. Defending the Functional Approach to
Congressional Standing
In the next Part, I describe various functional bases for congressional
standing. But before I do that, I undertake here to defend a functional ap-
proach to congressional standing in the first place. I first defend the norma-
tive underpinnings of a functional approach. Then, I highlight the benefits
that a functional approach to congressional standing offers.
168. Political science Professor Charles Cameron makes the point in the context of the
President’s power to veto legislation passed by Congress. Charles M. Cameron, Veto Bar-
gaining 9–10 (2000). He asks, “[h]ow can a weapon that is hardly ever used shape the content
of important legislation under frequently occurring circumstances?” Id. at 9. His response in
pertinent part is that “Congress will anticipate vetoes and modify the content of legislation to
head them off. The veto power will have shaped the content of legislation without actually
being used.” Id.
To offer a relatively simple example involving only a single chamber of Congress, the
President appoints federal officers and judges with the advice and consent of the Senate. U.S.
Const. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. Empirically, the Senate rejects only a small portion of the President’s
nominees. E.g., Glen S. Krutz et al., From Abe Fortas to Zoe Baird: Why Some Presidential
Nominations Fail in the Senate, 92 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 871, 874 (1998) (of 1,464 presidential
nominations in dataset, only seventy-one—less than 5 percent—failed).
Yet theory predicts that “presidents must anticipate the preferences of the Senate in order
to get their nominees confirmed.” David C. Nixon, Separation of Powers and Appointee Ideol-
ogy, 20 J.L. Econ. &SC Org. 438, 439 (2004); see also Byron J. Moraski & Charles R. Shipan,
The Politics of Supreme Court Nominations: A Theory of Institutional Constraints and Choices,
43 Am. J. Pol. Sci. 1069, 1071–78 (1999) (noting, depending on the relevant ideological place-
ment of the President’s preferred position, the Senate majority’s preferred position, and the
current ideological median on the Supreme Court, that the President may, in filling a Supreme
Court vacancy, be (1) able to move the Court median to his or her own preferred position,
(2) able to move the Court median in the direction of his or her preferred position but subject
to moderation by the Senate’s ideology, or (3) unable to move the Court median at all).
Empirical evidence bears out the theoretical prediction that Senate power to confirm
nominations affects the people the President chooses to nominate even if the Senate rarely
rejects nominees. See, e.g., Anthony Bertelli & Christian R. Grose, The Lengthened Shadow of
Another Institution? Ideal Point Estimates for the Executive Branch and Congress, 55 Am. J. Pol.
Sci. 766, 771–72 (2011) (“The bulk of . . . cabinets [initially appointed by Presidents Clinton
and George W. Bush] fell between the president and key congressional actors in ideological
terms.”); Moraski & Shipan, supra, at 1078–92 (finding empirical evidence that the relative
bargaining power of the President and Senate majority affected the ideology of nominees to
the Supreme Court); Nixon, supra, at 451–54 (presenting evidence that the President considers
the ideology of the Senate when nominating former members of Congress for positions that
require Senate approval, but not when nominating them for positions that do not require
Senate approval).
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A. The Normative Underpinnings of the Functional Approach
to Congressional Standing
There are three normative assumptions on which a functional approach
to congressional standing implicitly rests. First, standing turns on whether a
plaintiff has suffered an injury. Since the Constitution created Congress and
its members, it is logical that an imposition on Congress’s constitutionally
designed function constitutes an injury.
Second, as intuition suggests, a functional approach to congressional
standing is much more at home with a functionalist, rather than a formalist,
understanding of separation of powers.169 A formalist approach to standing
argues in favor of having standing restrict judicial power to cases that to
some degree at least meet the paradigm of common-law adjudication.170 As I
noted above (and as I and others have argued), Article III does not call for so
narrow a view of standing.171 In contrast, a functional approach to congres-
sional standing is consistent with a functionalist understanding of separation
of powers. It allows for the vindication of the political branches’ core func-
tions in the courts.
Third, a functional approach to congressional standing rests on the no-
tion that the various functions that the Constitution assigns to the branches
of the federal government are, out of separation-of-powers and structural
concerns, worthy of protection. It is for this reason that interference with a
branch’s core function might be seen as an “injury in fact” for standing
purposes.
Some disagree with the idea that separation of powers requires that par-
ticular branches’ claims to particular functions be vindicated. Perhaps most
prominently, Dean Elizabeth Magill argues that separation of powers re-
quires only that government power be diffuse across the branches, not that
particular branches enjoy particular checks over other branches.172
There are a few responses to this argument. One is that, doctrinally, the
Court has not subscribed to this view.173 That being the case, even if one
might believe that one should not in theory find injury when a branch finds
169. See Peter L. Strauss, Formal and Functional Approaches to Separation-of-Powers Ques-
tions—A Foolish Inconsistency?, 72 Cornell L. Rev. 488, 488–89 (1987) (contrasting “a for-
malistic approach to separation-of-powers issues grounded in the perceived necessity of
maintaining three distinct branches of government (and consequently appearing to draw
rather sharp boundaries)” and “a functional approach that stresses core function and relation-
ship, and permits a good deal of flexibility when those attributes are not threatened”). See
generally Linda D. Jellum, “Which Is to Be Master,” the Judiciary or the Legislature? When
Statutory Directives Violate Separation of Powers, 56 UCLA L. Rev. 837, 860–78 (2009).
170. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
171. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
172. M. Elizabeth Magill, Beyond Powers and Branches in Separation of Powers Law, 150 U.
Pa. L. Rev. 603, 654 (2001) (arguing that “the amount and character of . . . diffusion of state
power should be more than sufficient to put to rest concerns about dangerous concentrations
of power”).
173. See, e.g., INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 951 (1983).
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interference with one of its core functions, the Constitution—at least as it
has been interpreted—does indicate that there has been an injury.
A second response is that experience has proven Magill’s thesis—that an
inherent diffusion of power among the branches suffices to quell concerns
over dangerous concentrations of power—to be in error or at least over-
stated. Professor Neal Katyal describes how severely divided government in
recent years (and in particular the years since Magill advanced her thesis)
have led to “a massive increase in executive power.”174
A third response is that considerable political science literature suggests
that changes to a branch’s particular function and the division of power
among the branches will have an effect—indeed, often a fairly predictable
effect—on outcomes.175 Thus, generic diffusion of powers does not ensure
that the government will function according to the constitutional design;
outcomes are endogenous to the particular allocation of powers among the
branches. A functional approach to congressional standing recognizes this
and allows the legislature to vindicate its ability to shape outcomes.
B. The Benefits of the Functional Approach to Congressional Standing
The previous Section discussed the normative underpinnings of the
functional approach to congressional standing. In this Section, I highlight
the benefits the judicial system, and our federal system of government, gain
by turning to a functional approach in defining standing.
First, as discussed above, a functional approach to congressional stand-
ing views Congress’s functions realistically.176 In contrast, the Raines opinion
was unnecessarily stingy in its understanding of congressional function.177
Second, a functional approach to congressional standing is broadly con-
sistent with existing standing doctrine. It relies on the traditional tripartite
test for standing, and defines injury, appropriately, by reference to the func-
tions that Congress is constitutionally invited to undertake.178 To be sure, a
functional approach is not entirely consistent with certain statements of
dicta in the Raines opinion, and certain implications one can draw from
them. It is, however, consistent with the essential holding in Raines: a small
number of members of Congress ought not to have standing to challenge the
delegation of power effected by majority vote of both houses.179
Third, true to Supreme Court precedent—including Raines—the func-
tional approach preserves and validates separation-of-powers values.180
174. Katyal, supra note 110, at 2322 n.21 (“Time has not been kind to [Dean Magill’s]
claim.”).
175. See sources cited supra note 168.
176. See supra Section III.A.
177. See supra text accompanying notes 156–158.
178. See supra Part III.
179. See supra text accompanying notes 70–71.
180. To be fair, it adheres to those values more as they are understood through the lens
(perhaps not surprisingly) of the functionalist theory, not the formalist theory, of separation
of powers, in that a formalist approach to standing calls for the judiciary to involve itself in
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Adopting a functional approach is not the only way to vindicate separation-
of-powers values. For example, the D.C. Circuit’s pre-Raines precedent set
out to do so. But it did so atheoretically and haphazardly, through the use of
equitable discretion;181 separation of powers was an afterthought. In con-
trast, the functional approach offers a solid theoretical grounding to protect
separation-of-powers values.
Fourth, a functional approach validates a related value that is of great
importance in our republican federal system: the ability of constituents to
associate government actions with the elected officials responsible for those
actions in order to foster electoral accountability. Changes in bargaining
power between the branches may leave constituents with the misimpression
that a branch is responsible for a legal regime that is not (at least entirely) of
its crafting.182
Fifth, a functional approach to congressional standing would not em-
power the legislature or executive branch to gain inordinate control over the
federal courts’ dockets. Professor Maxwell Stearns has identified as a benefit
of standing doctrine that it protects against savvy litigants manipulating the
courts’ dockets to develop precedent selectively.183 Yet this concern is un-
founded. For one thing, the functional approach leaves robust constitutional
cases that take the form of common-law adjudication. See supra notes 169–171 and accompa-
nying text.
181. See supra text accompanying notes 126–128.
182. Cf. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2602 (2012) (plurality
opinion) (“Permitting the Federal Government to force the States to implement a federal pro-
gram would threaten the political accountability key to our federal system.”); New York v.
United States, 505 U.S. 144, 168 (1992) (“[W]here the Federal Government compels States to
regulate, the accountability of both state and federal officials is diminished.”).
There are many criticisms of judicial decisionmaking with an eye toward sustaining polit-
ical accountability. For the argument that officials of different governmental units might be
able to explain to voters exactly where responsibility for a government action or program lies
(or at least that courts systematically undervalue this possibility), see Evan H. Caminker, State
Sovereignty and Subordinacy: May Congress Commandeer State Officers to Implement Federal
Law?, 95 Colum L. Rev. 1001, 1061–64 (1995), and Erwin Chemerinsky, The Assumptions of
Federalism, 58 Stan. L. Rev. 1763, 1781 (2006). For the argument that accountability may not
truly result when judicial intervention is extensive, see Edward Rubin, The Myth of Accounta-
bility and the Anti-Administrative Impulse, 103 Mich. L. Rev. 2073, 2112 (2005). For the argu-
ment that there are downsides to accountability, see, for example, Jacob E. Gersen & Matthew
C. Stephenson, Over-Accountability, 6 J. Legal Analysis 185 (2014).
183. See Maxwell L. Stearns, Standing Back from the Forest: Justiciability and Social Choice,
83 Calif. L. Rev. 1309, 1323 n.48 (1995) (“[C]ommentators have failed to identify the reason
behind the general presumption against [ideological] litigation [that standing represents],
namely that a contrary rule would enable ideological litigants to manipulate the critically im-
portant path of case presentation.”); see also Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Limiting Article III Standing
to “Accidental” Plaintiffs: Lessons from Environmental and Animal Law Cases, 45 Ga. L. Rev. 1,
66–105 (2010) [hereinafter Pushaw, Accidental Plaintiffs] (arguing that standing is best under-
stood to limit court access to plaintiffs who have been injured because of chance events beyond
their control); Maxwell L. Stearns, Standing and Social Choice: Historical Evidence, 144 U. Pa.
L. Rev. 309, 348–404 (1995) (marshalling historical evidence and case law to support point
that standing doctrines prevent manipulation).
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limitations on standing in place; the mere existence of a statute that pur-
portedly authorizes a lawsuit is not sufficient to guarantee access to the
courts.184 For another, other than actions to compel the production of infor-
mation,185 actions by legislators against the executive would require the en-
dorsement of a sizable number of legislative plaintiffs (if not official
institutional imprimatur); thus, floodgates of litigation on the whim of a
single legislator (or a few of them) would hardly be thrown open. And the
notion of cases filed by single legislators to compel the production of infor-
mation under a duly enacted statute hardly raises the specter of controlling
dockets to produce valuable precedent. Further, as I have explained above,
constructing larger coalitions of legislators who agree to proceed via lawsuit
(as opposed to relying on more traditional political avenues) is likely to be
difficult (and, even with a vote to proceed, a lawsuit nevertheless may face
obstacles in moving forward).186
Relatedly, the Supreme Court has long interpreted the Constitution as
prohibiting federal courts from issuing advisory opinions to the political
branches of the government,187 and one might be concerned that too robust
a doctrine of congressional standing might enable the political branches to
wrest advisory opinions out of the judiciary. But if congressional standing
requires the assent of a sizable number of lawmakers, obtaining an advisory
opinion would call for the complicity of a large number of lawmakers.188
Indeed, if lawmakers sought a quick advisory opinion on a bill that pur-
ported to shift power to the executive, then standing would require the join-
der, and therefore the complicity, of a majority of lawmakers in a house—
including at least some who themselves had voted for the bill, which might
make the advisory nature of the request easier for a court to spot.189 More
184. For example, the Line Item Veto Act addressed in Raines included a provision that on
its face purported to allow individual members of Congress to file suit challenging the imple-
mentation of the Act. See Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 815–16 (1997). Despite this provision,
the Court in Raines rejected standing on Article III grounds, and my proposal would reach the
same result. But see Note, supra note 94, at 1758 (“[E]ven if it might be proper for the Court to
consider separation of powers in determining whether to grant standing, the fact that the
legislature specifically condoned congressional standing in this instance should have out-
weighed the Court’s reluctance to intervene.”).
185. See infra Section IV.A.
186. See supra notes 114–117 and accompanying text.
187. See, e.g., U.S. Nat’l Bank of Or. v. Indep. Ins. Agents of Am., Inc., 508 U.S. 439, 446
(1993).
188. Professor Pushaw argues that standing should be, and in practice generally is, limited
to “ ‘accidental’ plaintiffs,” i.e., those whose federal rights are violated “fortuitously—that is,
involuntarily as a result of a chance occurrence beyond [their] control, rather than as part of a
calculated effort to manufacture a lawsuit.” Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Fortuity and the Article III
“Case”: A Critique of Fletcher’s The Structure of Standing, 65 Ala. L. Rev. 289, 325 (2013)
[hereinafter Pushaw, Fortuity]; see also infra note 238. Only if lawmakers intentionally enact a
bill to test its constitutionality are they “part of a calculated effort to manufacture a lawsuit.”
Id.
189. While not impossible, one might question why a legislator who voted in favor of a
bill would soon thereafter challenge that very bill as effecting an unconstitutionally large shift
of power to the executive.
372 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 114:339
generally, in the ordinary course, there is no more reason to think that Con-
gress and the President would invent an interbranch conflict than to expect
executive agencies to fabricate an intrabranch dispute, and yet the Court has
been open to recognizing standing to adjudicate disputes between executive
agencies.190
Finally, a functional approach to congressional standing protects the po-
litical interests of states as well. In response to suggestions that the federal
system insufficiently protects the interests of states (especially in the wake of
popular election of senators), Professor Wechsler argues that the structure of
federal elective offices continues to give the states effective voice.191 Each
state elects two senators (regardless of population),192 each House member’s
constituency lies entirely within a state’s boundaries,193 and the President is
elected by electors who also are elected on a state-by-state basis.194 Since the
President is the only federal official elected nationwide—and indeed with a
constituency that crosses any state boundary—the bulk of state political pro-
tection is provided by Congress (and perhaps especially by the Senate).195 It
follows that an overly stingy view of congressional standing—such as that
propounded by the Raines majority—undercuts the interests of the states.
Especially given the Court’s recognition that states are due “special solici-
tude” in the standing analysis when states themselves are the plaintiffs,196 it
is quite odd for another part of standing jurisprudence to reduce the inter-
ests of the states.
190. See Mead, supra note 43, at 1231–58 (detailing the history of such suits). For com-
mentary supportive of broad standing for intrabranch disputes, see Michael Herz, United
States v. United States: When Can the Federal Government Sue Itself?, 32 Wm. & Mary L. Rev.
893, 898 (1991) (“[I]f an intragovernmental dispute has actually reached the courts, that very
fact indicates that there is concrete adversity sufficient to satisfy article III and that the Presi-
dent is not in fact in control and capable of resolving the dispute . . . .”), and Michael W.
Steinberg, Can EPA Sue Other Federal Agencies?, 17 Ecology L.Q. 317, 324–52 (1990) (finding
no constitutional barrier to EPA suits against other federal agencies). For a critique of the
current approach to standing in intrabranch disputes that nevertheless approve of standing in
some settings, see Mead, supra note 43, at 1258–78 (calling for standing when the plaintiff
agency pursues a nonsovereign interest).
191. See Wechsler, supra note 28, at 546–60.
192. U.S. Const. art. I, § 3, cl. 1. See generally Wechsler, supra note 28, at 546–48 (dis-
cussing the robust role of the Senate in protecting states’ interests).
193. U.S. Const. art. I, § 2. See generally Wechsler, supra note 28, at 551–52 (discussing
the ramifications of having House districts lie entirely within states).
194. U.S. Const. art. II, § 1. See generally Wechsler, supra note 28, at 552–56 (discussing
the importance of having state-by-state voting of electors).
195. See Wechsler, supra note 28, at 558 (“It is in light of th[e] inherent tendency [of the
government to preserve the domain of the states], reflected most importantly in Congress, that
the governmental power distribution clauses of the Constitution gain their largest meaning as
an instrument for the protection of the states. Those clauses, as is well known, have served far
more to qualify or stop intrusive legislative measures in the Congress than to invalidate en-
acted legislation in the Supreme Court.”).
196. See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 520 (2007) (“[I]n protecting its quasi-sover-
eign interests, [a state] is entitled to special solicitude in our standing analysis.”).
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To be fair, congressional standing might not pave the way to results that
Congress, or members of Congress, would prefer. Professor Huq suggests
that courts’ decisionmaking expertise is likely to be at low ebb in deciding
interbranch disputes,197 and further that federal judges may tend to be
predisposed—owing both to the President’s appointment powers and the
reliance of the federal judiciary on the executive branch to attain enforce-
ment of its orders—to ruling in favor of the President.198 And Professor
Chafetz argues that Congress risks weakening itself by resorting to judicial
remedy, since it thus both concedes that it cannot obtain relief on its own
and renders itself subservient to the judicial branch.199
To the extent these points are valid, they are policy arguments against
Congress (or members thereof) taking advantage of congressional standing
and seeking help from the courts.200 They are not, however, reasons not to
recognize congressional standing in the first place. Standing opens court-
house doors; it does not promise the relief that the plaintiff seeks on the
merits.201
IV. Defining the Contours of Congressional Standing
In this Part, I rely on the functions of Congress elucidated in Part II to
extract functional bases for congressional standing. A functional theory of
congressional standing would recognize standing in limited circumstances,
such as when a majority of a house of Congress (or enough legislators to
effect a particular outcome) challenged executive action that systematically
and substantially diminished the majority’s bargaining power. In this Part, I
explore and give definition to the contours of congressional standing. In
Sections IV.A and IV.B, I draw on the discussion in Part II to derive appro-
priate functional-based settings for congressional standing. In Section IV.A,
I consider information-based congressional standing, and then, in Section
IV.B, I turn to voting-based congressional standing. In Section IV.C, I ex-
plore several nonfunctional bases for congressional standing. Finally, in Sec-
tion IV.D, I complete the discussion by observing how other limitations on
standing—in particular, the political-question doctrine—would still apply
under the standards for congressional standing that I set out.
A. Information-Based Standing
As detailed above, Congress’s power to gather information in further-
ance of its legislative agenda and activities is well established. It is a core
197. See Huq, supra note 112, at 1676.
198. See id. at 1678–79.
199. See infra note 206.
200. See infra note 206.
201. See Jonathan Remy Nash, Standing and the Precautionary Principle, 108 Colum. L.
Rev. 494, 498 (2008) (“[T]he question of standing generally arises before the merits and gen-
erally does not prejudice any ultimate determination on the merits . . . .”).
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constitutional function.202 The power to conduct investigations empowers
Congress to “exercise its legislative function advisedly and effectively.”203
Thus, an impediment to Congress’s investigatory power and processes in-
jures Congress’s ability to legislate effectively. Accordingly, it is clear that
Congress suffers an injury when its investigative efforts are stymied.
While Raines could be read to question even the standing of Congress
(or a duly authorized congressional committee) to subpoena private wit-
nesses, it has—quite properly—never been invoked for that purpose. Courts
have invoked Raines, on the other hand, to question the standing of a com-
mittee to compel the provision of testimony and information from executive
branch actors.204 The reliance on Raines is more “at home” in the context of
congressional standing to enforce a subpoena against the executive branch
because Raines itself involved a conflict between members of Congress and
the executive branch, and the Raines opinion highlights the relevance of that
setting at certain points.205
Still, in the end, the notion that Raines somehow draws into question
constitutional standing when a congressional committee enforces a sub-
poena against an executive branch actor, but not otherwise, is implausible.206
There is simply no reason to assess the injury suffered by the house of Con-
gress any differently in the two settings. To the extent that one accepts an
202. See supra text accompanying notes 159–164.
203. McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135, 161 (1927).
204. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
205. See supra notes 98–105 and accompanying text.
206. See Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform v. Holder, 979 F. Supp. 2d 1, 13–14
(D.D.C. 2013); Comm. on the Judiciary v. Miers, 558 F. Supp. 2d 53, 67–70 (D.D.C. 2008),
appeal dismissed, 2009 WL 3568649 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 14, 2009); Raoul Berger, Executive
Privilege: A Constitutional Myth 320–26 (1974) (arguing that courts should recognize
standing when Congress seeks to enforce a subpoena against the executive branch, at least
when suit is statutorily authorized); Tara Leigh Grove & Neal Devins, Congress’s (Limited)
Power to Represent Itself in Court, 99 Cornell L. Rev. 571, 574–75, 597–603 (2014) (discuss-
ing historical examples of the congressional subpoena power over the executive); see also Una
Lee, Note, Reinterpreting Raines: Legislator Standing to Enforce Congressional Subpoenas, 98
Geo. L.J. 1165, 1184–92 (2010) (agreeing with the result, but not the reasoning, of Miers); cf.
Todd D. Peterson, Prosecuting Executive Branch Officials for Contempt of Congress, 66 N.Y.U. L.
Rev. 563, 616–31 (1991) (arguing that Congress ought not have the power to bring criminal
contempt proceedings against the executive branch to enforce subpoenas against claims of
executive privilege, but further suggesting that courts should enforce that limitation based on
prudential and equitable concerns rather than Article III standing).
Professor Chafetz argues to the contrary that in Miers “all three branches . . . have acted
improperly . . . so as to diminish Congress’s constitutional powers.” Chafetz, supra note 7, at
1093. Chafetz’s overarching point, however, can be taken as a policy argument—that Congress
erred in selecting to seek judicial relief instead of simply relying on its own powers in the
conflict with the executive branch. See id. at 1152–55 (“[T]he problem in Miers is that every
actor except Congress is being institutionally supremacist.”). Seen in this light, it is not surpris-
ing that Chafetz notes that the three branches that have acted to diminish Congress’s powers
“includ[e] . . . perhaps most significantly, Congress itself.” Id. at 1093; see also id. at 1155
(“The court, in sweeping aside the results of [attempts at negotiation between the legislative
and executive branches], . . . projected an air of legitimacy at the expense of Congress. And
Congress not only let the court do it; it asked the court to do it.”).
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injury when a congressional investigation is impeded, one must reach the
same conclusion when the target of the investigation lies in the executive
branch. And, as discussed above, the Raines Court highlighting separation-
of-powers in the standing inquiry was not meant to suggest that Congress
can never challenge the executive. Indeed, it does not seem even to mean (as
some lower courts have taken it207) that standing is more rigorous when
there is an interbranch dispute.208
Standing should similarly be clear when Congress has called for divul-
gence of information not by subpoena but by statutory directive, and has
authorized members of Congress to bring suit to enforce the statute. The
Supreme Court has recognized the standing of individual citizens to pursue
information when statutorily authorized.209 Further, it seems clear that an
informational injury to a house of Congress, or its members, will be even
more particularized than a similar injury to an ordinary citizen: if an ordi-
nary citizen’s right to vote can support an informational injury, then surely
the same must be true for a member of Congress whose job it is to cast votes
(in addition to drafting appropriate legislation and holding hearings).
Standing under such a statutory authorization should extend to mem-
bers of Congress who constitute less than a majority of the house to which
they belong—including individual members. An individual member of Con-
gress will be unable to secure a subpoena on behalf of the house or a com-
mittee thereof. Thus, in the absence of a statutory disclosure mandate and
authorization to pursue relief, a member of Congress lacks standing to com-
pel disclosure from the executive, even though the member asserts her sub-
jective belief that the information in question would enhance her legislative
effectiveness.210 When Congress has directed disclosure and authorized suit,
however, it has effectively validated the notion that the information en-
hances legislative effectiveness, and thus validated an individual member’s
standing to pursue disclosure of that information.
B. Voting-Based Standing
1. Vote Nullification
We turn next to the voting side of the ledger. Suits by Congress (or
members of Congress) that ground standing on injury to voting rights will
207. See supra note 149 and accompanying text.
208. See supra text accompanying notes 117–118.
209. See FEC v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 24–25 (1998) (“We conclude that . . . the informa-
tional injury at issue here, directly related to voting, the most basic of political rights, is suffi-
ciently concrete and specific such that the fact that it is widely shared does not deprive
Congress of constitutional power to authorize its vindication in the federal courts.”); see also
Cass R. Sunstein, Informational Regulation and Informational Standing: Akins and Beyond, 147
U. Pa. L. Rev. 613, 637–53 (1999) (providing theoretical support for the conclusion of the
Court in Akins).
210. See Harrington v. Bush, 553 F.2d 190, 212–13 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (rejecting standing
based on congressman’s “subjective” belief that information would improve his legislative
effectiveness).
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almost always name some executive branch actor or actors as the defendant
and allege some sort of interference in legislative voting power by the execu-
tive branch—really a shift in the balance of power from the legislature.211
Raines affirmed that actual vote nullification generates an injury and
thus can be a valid basis for standing.212 Raines contemplated that standing
grounded in allegations of vote nullification will not exist when pursued by
an individual lawmaker or a small group of lawmakers. Rather, standing
turns on whether the action is joined by “legislators whose votes would have
been sufficient to defeat (or enact) a specific legislative Act.”213 In other
words, at a minimum, a suit should be joined by enough legislators that they
could together defeat or enact the bill at issue in that chamber.214 This avoids
the unseemly possibility of having legislators who definitively lost the politi-
cal battle relitigate the issue in a judicial forum.215
Elsewhere, Raines suggests that a claim of standing is further bolstered
when the entire house of Congress endorses the lawsuit.216 But a moment’s
reflection confirms that actual institutional imprimatur—that is, the effec-
tive endorsement of a suit by a majority of a congressional house—ought
not to be required for standing to exist. After all, there are some matters for
which the Constitution requires a supermajority,217 and it would make little
211. It also is possible for one house of Congress (or members thereof) to sue the other
house for shifting the intrabranch legislative balance of power (consider that the legislative
veto in INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983), was problematic both because it increased Con-
gress’s power at the expense of the President’s, id. at 944–48, and because it violated the
constitutional requirement of bicameralism, id. at 948–51), or for a member of a house to
allege that his or her own voting rights have been improperly curtailed, see, e.g., Raines v.
Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 814 (1997) (describing suit brought by members of Congress against the
Secretary of the Treasury and the Director of the Office of Management and Budget); Powell v.
McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969).
212. I assume that the Raines Court’s suggestion that Coleman might not apply to federal
legislators suing in federal court was mere dicta. Raines, 521 U.S. at 823. Certainly, from a
functional standpoint vote nullification gives rise to an injury. See id. at 824 n.8.
213. Id. at 823.
214. I note a facial inconsistency between the idea that a larger group of legislators should
have standing to sue when an individual legislator would not, and the argument I have ad-
vanced elsewhere—based on the “expected value” of an injury—that a lone member of a
group should have standing to sue if the entire group would have standing. See Nash, supra
note 39, at 1307. In the end, the difference here is that the individual legislator’s injury is not
some fraction of the entire house’s injury; rather the house (or a large enough group of legisla-
tors) will have an institutional injury that the individual member cannot muster.
215. See Raines, 521 U.S. at 824 (“[Plaintiffs] have not alleged that they voted for a specific
bill, that there were sufficient votes to pass the bill, and that the bill was nonetheless deemed
defeated. In the vote on the Act, their votes were given full effect. They simply lost that vote.”);
see also Huq, supra note 112, at 1677.
216. Raines, 521 U.S. at 829.
217. See, e.g., U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (“[The President] shall have Power, by and with
the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators
present concur . . . .).
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sense to expect (let alone require218) institutional imprimatur when, for ex-
ample, forty Senators who voted against ratification of a treaty challenged
the President’s decision to nevertheless implement the treaty.219
Can there be congressional injury beyond the setting of pure vote nulli-
fication (as described by the Court in Raines)?220 As I have discussed, it is a
cabined view indeed that Congress’s legislative role is limited to the actual
casting and counting of votes. It follows that the potential for congressional
injury ought to extend beyond the limited scope that Raines suggests—to
settings in which the relative power of Congress is reduced vis-a`-vis the
218. If institutional imprimatur from a majority of members of the relevant house were
required to support a lawsuit joined by the “nay” voters in a failed supermajority vote, then a
bare majority of house members who voted in favor of an action that failed to obtain a
supermajority vote could withhold institutional imprimatur and thus deprive the prevailing
“nay” voting bloc of standing.
219. See Note, supra note 94, at 1756–57; cf. Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996 (1979)
(challenge to presidential termination of ratified treaty without Senate consent, albeit brought
by a small number of legislators).
My framework for standing produces outcomes similar to, but not coextensive with, the
views of Professor Lawrence Dessem. Dessem would generally not allow standing for individ-
ual legislators, see Dessem, supra note 53, at 13–26, and finds institutional endorsement to be
critical for successful standing, see id. at 26–30. I generally agree that individual legislators
ought not to have standing, but find an exception when Congress provides a statutory basis for
standing to pursue information from the executive branch. I also agree that institutional ap-
proval for suit will generally be required for standing, but also recognize that there are settings
in which less than majority approval might suffice.
220. The work of Professor Tara Leigh Grove suggests that the answer to this question
should be “no,” although on reflection one might think that the work does not reach this
particular question. Together with Professor Neal Devins, Grove has argued that Congress has
standing to enforce subpoenas, see Grove & Devins, supra note 206 (a point with which I
agree, see supra note 206 and accompanying text), but does not have standing to enforce or
defend statutes, see id. (a point with which I also agree, see supra Section IV.A). Along the way,
Grove and Devins suggest that the congressional power to enforce subpoenas arises because of
specific constitutional text that authorizes each chamber of Congress to “establish and enforce
rules governing its internal proceedings.” Grove & Devins, supra note 206, at 577. This sug-
gests that the authorization to enforce subpoenas is a limited exception to the otherwise abso-
lute rule denying Congress the power (and concomitantly judicial standing) to enforce laws.
In subsequent, separate work, Grove further argues that the political branches should be
held to standards for standing that exceed Article III: for the executive to have standing, Article
II must provide a basis, and for Congress to have standing, Article I must provide a basis. See
Grove, Standing Outside of Article III, supra note 33, at 1314. Grove then relies on her work
with Devins to conclude that Congress lacks standing to defend federal statutes from constitu-
tional attack. See id. at 1353–65.
In the end, it seems that these commentators are concerned with Congress’s standing to
represent the United States in court. There, I agree that that power extends to enforcing sub-
poenas and not defending laws against general attack. But when Congress asserts a loss of its
bargaining power under the Constitution—or, for that matter, even vote nullification—it is
not representing the interests of “the United States,” but rather asserting its own injury, much
as any other litigant would. Even if one accepts Grove’s suggestion that Congress needs to
satisfy Article I to establish standing to represent the United States, it seems inappropriate to
apply such a requirement when Congress appears instead on its own behalf.
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executive branch,221 or in which the relative power of one house of Congress
to another is reduced.
Note that this understanding provides logical support for challenges to
alleged vote nullification over longer time horizons. Consider that, under the
Raines Court’s stingy definition of vote nullification, a challenge that the
President has nullified a duly enacted law would seem to require the very
legislators who voted for the bill to join the suit, and that might be techni-
cally impossible if the alleged nullification occurred in the next (or a later)
Congress and enough legislators who had voted for the bill had retired or
left office. Note, moreover, that this would remain the case even if the legisla-
tors who took their seats would have voted for the original bill. (More gener-
ally, a member of Congress who voted for a bill that failed might still be
injured by, and join a lawsuit to contest, the President’s action in neverthe-
less implementing the failed bill as law; the member might have supported
the content of the bill as a matter of policy yet be concerned about the
dilution of congressional power the President’s implementation of an
unenacted bill might effect.) For the same reasons that underlie Raines’s
reaffirmance of Coleman, there similarly should be standing to recognize
challenges to vote nullification over time.
2. Standing Based on Process-Bargaining Power Reduction
We turn now to settings in which congressional votes are not nullified,
yet (in line with the discussion above in Part II) executive action is alleged to
reduce the legislature’s process-bargaining power.222 As above in the vote-
221. Cf. Clinton v. New York, 524 U.S. 417, 449–50 (1998) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“To
say the political branches have a somewhat free hand to reallocate their own authority would
seem to require acceptance of two premises: first, that the public good demands it, and second,
that liberty is not at risk. The former premise is inadmissible. The Constitution’s structure
requires a stability which transcends the convenience of the moment . . . . The latter premise,
too, is flawed. Liberty is always at stake when one or more of the branches seek to transgress
the separation of powers.”).
222. Professor John Harrison argues that an executive branch failure to comply with, or
implement, a law validly produced by Congress should give rise to no cognizable injury on the
part of Congress (or any subset thereof). See Harrison, supra note 53. He explains that, “when
Congress acts within its [constitutional] grants, the result is valid and binding law.” Id. at 6.
But “compliance and implementation are distinct from validity.” Id. Indeed, Harrison, argues,
“a private person can be said to violate a statute, and an executive officer can be said not to
have carried it out properly, only because validity is independent of compliance and imple-
mentation.” Id. On this basis, he concludes that “failure of implementation by the executive
does not impair the legislative power.” Id. Harrison elucidates: “If the legislative power is
diminished when executive officials do not carry the law out, it is just as much diminished
when private people violate it. Yet the Constitution does not allow federal legislators or houses
of Congress to participate in enforcing private obligations.” Id. at 8–9.
Though not without weight, Harrison’s argument is ultimately unconvincing. Harrison
assumes that the relevant harm to Congress when the executive branch does not implement or
enforce a statute is the actual lack of implementation or enforcement. As I have explained,
however, the relevant harm should be conceived instead as an interference with Congress’s
core functions. Viewed in that light, the distinction between private violation of a statute and
executive nonenforcement becomes clear: the private violation does not threaten Congress’s
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nullification context, a prerequisite to congressional standing based on a re-
duction in legislative bargaining power should be that (at a minimum) the
complaint is joined by enough legislators in at least one chamber of Con-
gress that they could exercise the power alleged to be reduced. For example,
a claim that the executive branch improperly withdrew from a duly ratified
treaty without obtaining Senate assent should be joined, at a minimum, by
enough Senators to have blocked the executive action were there a vote—
that is, by one-third of Senators.223
Beyond that, the interaction of two factors—the scope of the threat to
legislative bargaining power going forward, and the extent to which the exec-
utive action is unilateral—allows us to consider four paradigmatic settings
for exercises of executive power that affect the bargaining power of Congress.
They are set out graphically in Table 1.
Table 1.
Different Settings of Power Shifts from Congress
to the Executive
Scope of shift in power
Narrow shift in power Broad shift in power
Extent to which the 
executive action is 
unilateral
Congress delegated 
power A: no standing B: probably standing
Executive acted 
unilaterally C: probably no standing D: standing
In setting A, Congress has formally delegated power to the executive
branch, and the shift in power is relatively narrow. Here, one might think of
an agency interpreting a statute under a delegated power but (it is alleged)
overreaching in its interpretation. The power shift does not suggest a threat
functions and accordingly cannot provide standing for a lawsuit; in contrast, executive inac-
tion (or, as the case may be) action might, and accordingly might be actionable.
I note that, while Harrison affords the Coleman case a narrow reading, see id. at 7, the
reading he does give to Coleman accords with a functional approach to congressional standing.
Professor Harrison argues that the Court’s decision in Coleman is best read as recognizing
legislative standing to call for the production of “a proper record of legislative action.” Id. at 6
(quoting Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 437 (1939)). But that record was necessary to sup-
port the plaintiffs’ argument that “their votes had in fact defeated ratification by creating a tie
that the Lieutenant Governor had no power to break.” Id. at 8 n.31. Putting that in the lan-
guage of this Article, the Kansas state legislators sought the record to validate their argument
that their core legislative functions had been undermined by the lieutenant governor’s action.
See id. at 26 (“As Chief Justice Hughes pointed out in Coleman, the Court’s cases allow public
officials as such to litigate on the basis of their official powers and responsibilities.”).
223. Goldwater v. Carter, 617 F.2d 697, 702 (D.C. Cir. 1979), vacated on other grounds,
444 U.S. 996 (1979).
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to congressional power in the future: in addition to remaining free to with-
draw the delegated power or to override the executive action, Congress still
enjoys the right to vote on future delegations of power.224
In setting B, Congress has formally delegated power to the executive
branch, and the shift in power is relatively broad. Here, one might think of
the Line Item Veto Act, under which Congress tried to delegate a founda-
tional increase in power to the executive.225 Such a shift poses much more of
a threat (compared to setting A) to congressional power in the future: while
Congress still remains free to withdraw the delegated power or to override
particular executive actions under that power, the shift in power (while it
persists) removes the initial prerogative to vote from Congress (with con-
trolling effect) on particular issues that it had the power to vote on before.
In settings C and D, Congress has not formally delegated power to the
executive branch; rather, the executive branch has acted unilaterally. In set-
ting C, the shift in power is relatively narrow. Here, one might think of the
President issuing an executive order in an area typically within the purview
of the executive branch (that is, subject to regulation without express con-
gressional authorization), such as executive branch organization.226 The
power shift does not suggest a threat to congressional power in the future,
insofar as the area was already one in which congressional input was not
required. At the same time, the unilateral nature of the executive action
makes the setting more problematic than setting A. Also falling within the
224. Another type of legislative–executive interaction that falls within this setting is what
Professors David Barron and Todd Rakoff refer to as “little waiver.” David J. Barron & Todd D.
Rakoff, In Defense of Big Waiver, 113 Colum. L. Rev. 265, 276–77 (2013). Barron and Rakoff
consider Congress to have granted an agency a power of waiver when it confers on the agency
“[t]he power to waive a statutory requirement.” Id. at 272. In turn, a little waiver is “the power
to merely ‘modify’ or ‘tinker’ with a statute through the lifting of limited aspects of a require-
ment contained within it in order to handle an unusual application.” Id. at 277. Little waiver as
thus defined is explicitly limited in scope, since it is “not . . . a power that is conferred in the
expectation that the heart of the statutory framework . . . will be subject to administrative
veto.” Id.
Since (1) little waiver thus contemplates an affirmative delegation of authority by Con-
gress but at the same time (2) its exercise effects only a “little” shift in interbranch power, little
waiver falls within the ambit of setting A.
225. See supra notes 64–65 and accompanying text.
Another legislative–executive interaction that would fall under setting B occurs when the
legislature attempts to delegate authority to an agency that is so broad that it comes close to
running afoul of—if it does not actually run afoul of—the nondelegation principle. See A.L.A.
Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 537–38 (1935); see also Barron &
Rakoff, supra note 224, at 268 (“[T]he Line Item Veto Act . . . [is] big waiver’s very own
Schechter Poultry . . . .”).
226. See, e.g., Chenoweth v. Clinton, 181 F.3d 112 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (dismissing congres-
sional challenge to President Clinton’s power to set up the American Heritage Rivers Initiative
by executive order). For further discussion, see supra notes 131–137 and accompanying text.
But see Peri E. Arnold, Making the Managerial Presidency: Comprehensive Reorgan-
ization Planning, 1905–1996, at 18–20 (2d ed., rev. 1998) (describing the nineteenth-cen-
tury view that executive reorganization was a legislative prerogative); Barry D. Karl, Executive
Reorganization and Presidential Power, 1977 Sup. Ct. Rev. 1 (detailing congressional involve-
ment in executive reorganizations).
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ambit of setting C would be a signing statement by the President that ex-
presses the executive branch’s interpretation of a bill that the President signs
into law,227 as well as an executive branch decision not to defend a statute on
the ground that it is, in the executive branch’s view, not constitutional.228
In setting D, the relatively broad shift in power accompanies the unilat-
eral executive action. Here, one might think of the President issuing an exec-
utive order in an area typically not within his purview, for example,
unilaterally amending a duly enacted statute.229 This setting is the most
problematic of the four.
227. See, e.g., Phillip J. Cooper, By Order of the President: The Use and Abuse of
Executive Direct Action 201 (2002) (“Presidential signing statements . . . are announce-
ments made by the president, usually prepared by the Justice Department, that . . . provide the
president’s interpretation of the language of the law, announce constitutional limits on the
implementation of some of its provisions, or indicate directions to executive branch officials as
to how to administer the new law in an acceptable manner.”). While the statements are unilat-
eral executive action, they generally do not pose a broad threat to congressional power, espe-
cially since they are based on good-faith beliefs on the part of the executive. As such, they
ought not generally to give rise to congressional standing to challenge them. See Jason A. Derr,
Comment, Raines, Raines, Go Away: How Presidential Signing Statements and Senate Bill 3731
Should Lead to a New Doctrine of Legislative Standing, 56 Cath. U. L. Rev. 1237 (2007) (argu-
ing against the viability of a bill that would have granted Congress institutional standing to
challenge the legality of presidential signing statements). But see Ryan McManus, Note, Sitting
in Congress and Standing in Court: How Presidential Signing Statements Open the Door to Legis-
lator Lawsuits, 48 B.C. L. Rev. 739 (2007) (arguing that, in general, signing statements do not
effect vote nullification and therefore do not give rise to standing, but also arguing that signing
statements that limit the flow of information to Congress should give rise to standing); James
A. Turner, Comment, The Post-Medellı´n Case for Legislative Standing, 59 Am. U. L. Rev. 731
(2010) (arguing that members of the Senate should have standing to challenge an executive
determination that a duly ratified treaty is non-self-executing).
228. For example, the Court in Windsor approved of the executive branch’s decision not
to defend the constitutionality of the Defense of Marriage Act. United States v. Windsor, 133 S.
Ct. 2675 (2013). The Court emphasized that “it poses grave challenges to the separation of
powers for the Executive at a particular moment to be able to nullify Congress’ enactment
solely on its own initiative and without any determination from the Court.” Id. at 2688. The
Court also explained that “there is no suggestion here that it is appropriate for the Executive as
a matter of course to challenge statutes in the judicial forum rather than making the case to
Congress for their amendment or repeal,” id. at 2689, and that “this case it not routine,” id.
Thus, it seems that the executive branch’s occasional decision not to defend a statute based on
a good-faith belief in the statute’s unconstitutionality does not pose a threat of a significant
shift in power away from the legislature. Thus, even though it is unilateral executive action, it
ought not in general to give rise to congressional standing. Indeed, it would seem that execu-
tive action not to defend a statute on constitutional grounds should not give Congress standing
to defend the statute against challenge by a private party. Grove & Devins, supra note 206, at
593–97, 623–30; see Grove, supra note 33, at 1353–65 (so concluding both normatively and
because Article I provides additional standing requirement yet conveys no such power on
Congress). Contra Gorod, supra note 12, at 1247–50. Again, however, the Windsor Court sug-
gests that it might be more problematic—and therefore standing conceivably could inhere—
were the executive to engage in the practice more broadly. See Bradford C. Mank, Does United
States v. Windsor (the DOMA Case) Open the Door to Congressional Standing Rights?, 76 U.
Pitt. L. Rev. 1, 60–62 (2014) (suggesting that Windsor leaves the door open to Congress’s
standing to defend the constitutionality of a federal statute when the executive branch does not
do so).
229. This might rise to the level of actual vote nullification.
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A more nuanced approach sees the two variables we have identified as
continuous. Congressional involvement in the power delegation could range
from full complicity to no involvement, without being dichotomous. For
example, the executive branch enjoys discretion as to when to exercise its
statutory enforcement powers; this arises because Congress legislates against
a backdrop of executive prosecutorial discretion.230
Similarly, the nature of the power shift could range from minimal to
broad. For example, while Schechter Poultry establishes an outer limit to
Congress’s freedom to delegate, subsequent case law has made clear that that
limit is hardly constraining.231 Translating the flimsiness of the nondelega-
tion doctrine to the current setting, Congress can convey hefty power on the
executive branch without effecting a fundamental threat to congressional
bargaining power.232
230. For example, one might consider the executive branch’s generally accepted discretion
to exercise its enforcement powers as midway between legislative delegation and unilateral
executive action. See, e.g., Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607 (1985) (“In our criminal
justice system, the Government retains ‘broad discretion’ as to whom to prosecute.” (quoting
United States v. Goodwin, 457 U.S. 368, 380 n.11 (1982))). Discretionary enforcement power
is not delegated expressly, yet it is also assumed that “Congress legislates against a background
assumption of prosecutorial discretion.” Abuelhawa v. United States, 556 U.S. 816, 823 n.3
(2009). Indeed, Professor Rachel Barkow describes how Congress affirmatively takes into ac-
count prosecutors’ discretion to engage in plea bargaining by deliberately enacting criminal
statutes with “inflated or mandatory punishments.” Rachel E. Barkow, Institutional Design and
the Policing of Prosecutors: Lessons from Administrative Law, 61 Stan. L. Rev. 869, 880 (2009).
That said, courts and commentators recognize that judicial relief remains available when
prosecutorial discretion exceeds statutory and constitutional boundaries. See, e.g., United
States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 464 (1996) (“[A] prosecutor’s discretion is ‘subject to con-
stitutional constraints.’ ” (quoting United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114, 125 (1979)));
Nader v. Saxbe, 497 F.2d 676, 679 n.19 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (“[T]he exercise of prosecutorial
discretion . . . is subject to statutory and constitutional limits enforceable through judicial
review.”); cf. Zachary S. Price, Enforcement Discretion and Executive Duty, 67 Vand. L. Rev.
671, 748–49 (2014) (“First, executive officials should not presume unbounded discretion to
decline enforcement of statutes when the statutory context does not suggest that Congress
anticipated such discretion. . . . Second, even in areas like criminal law, where substantial
nonenforcement of statutes is inevitable, executive officials should understand their task as a
matter of priority setting within the parameters of statutory policy, not one of crafting policy-
based exceptions to statutory coverage.”); Cass R. Sunstein, Reviewing Agency Inaction After
Heckler v. Chaney, 52 U. Chi. L. Rev. 653, 670 (1985) (noting in the context of agency inac-
tion that “there is a distinction between exercising . . . discretion and refusing to carry out
obligations that Congress has imposed on the executive”). It may be that, similarly, congres-
sional standing could be available when the executive action constitutes prosecutorial decisions
that consistently can be seen to undermine congressional statutes, and thus to pose a broader
threat to congressional power.
231. See, e.g., Evan J. Criddle, When Delegation Begets Domination: Due Process of Admin-
istrative Lawmaking, 46 Ga. L. Rev. 117, 143–46 (2011) (detailing the decline of the nondele-
gation doctrine); Gary Lawson, Delegation and Original Meaning, 88 Va. L. Rev. 327, 329
(2002) (noting that by 1989 the Supreme Court had declared the nondelegation doctrine effec-
tively a “dead letter”).
232. The same presumably would be true of what Barron and Rakoff term “big waivers”
(but not the biggest waivers that go too far). See Barron & Rakoff, supra note 224, at 278
(“[M]any grants of big waiver authority . . . mirror big delegation.”); id. at 310–34 (defending
the legality of “big waivers”).
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A more comprehensive examination of these two factors helps to clarify
how the framework articulated in Table 1 functions.
i. Scope of the Shift in Power from the
Legislature to the Executive Branch
First, the alleged relative power shift toward the executive can be broad
or limited. Whether a power shift is broad or narrow is determined not by
reference to the scope of the particular act the executive branch has taken,
but rather on the likely impact of the scope of the action—and the rationale
underlying it—on the balance of power between the branches. Thus, for
example, the exercise of the cancelation power assailed in Raines v. Byrd was
narrow—any exercise of the power would affect only the actual spending
and tax benefit measures subject to cancelation—but the effect of allowing
such cancelations to go forward under the Line Item Veto Act as a general
matter was potentially quite broad.233 On the other hand, the issuance of a
regulation pursuant to statutory authority poses little threat to future exer-
cises of legislative power.
One would expect allegations of broad shifts in power to be more likely
to give rise to standing. The functional approach to congressional standing
ties standing to the impact of the alleged action on the legislature’s bargain-
ing power. The broader the scope of the power shift effected by the executive
action, the greater the diminishment of legislative bargaining power, and
hence the more likely it becomes for Congress to have standing to challenge
that executive action.
ii. The Extent to Which the Executive Action Is Unilateral.
Second, Congress (or a house of Congress) can lose relative power to the
executive branch by virtue of legislation or unilateral executive action. As
above, for example, the executive branch might issue a regulation under di-
rect congressional authorization, or it might proceed by executive order
without authorization from, and indeed in contradiction to, a statute.
Since Congress has the option of withdrawing authority it has granted,
cases have suggested that congressional standing would be more likely when
executive action is unilateral.234 On reflection, however, this distinction turns
out to have less force than some have suggested. As an initial matter, con-
sider that, if Congress must resort to impeachment before commencing a
lawsuit (a view endorsed by the D.C. Circuit in the Campbell case235), virtu-
ally no shift of power to the executive is unilateral. Under such a view, the
failure to resort to impeachment constitutes complicity in the power shift.
233. Cf. Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA, 134 S. Ct. 2427, 2446 (2014) (“Were we to
recognize the authority claimed by EPA” to alter by regulation the threshold for triggering
application of part of the Clean Air Act from the emission of 250 tons, to 100,000 tons, of
pollutant annually, “we would deal a severe blow to the Constitution’s separation of powers”).
234. See supra text accompanying notes 135, 141.
235. See supra text accompanying notes 142, 150–151.
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Yet, were that the case, Congress (or houses and members thereof) would be
embarking on a fundamental constitutional showdown with the President,236
and one moreover that is not at all likely to be focused on the underlying
policy dispute.237 While judicial intervention might not be the preferred
means by which to resolve an interbranch dispute, still it seems infinitely
preferable to the prospect of impeachment.
More generally (and even rejecting the extreme view that resort to im-
peachment is a prerequisite to congressional standing), the notion that the
greater access that members of Congress (and by extension the houses them-
selves) enjoy to the political process should reduce the likelihood of congres-
sional standing is at least somewhat questionable. One house of Congress
alone cannot repeal a statute. And, even if majorities in both houses of Con-
gress support repeal of a statutorily authorized shift of power to the execu-
tive, that is not enough to repeal if (as seems likely) the President vetoes it.
In short, the prospects for repeal will in general be remote enough that it
makes little sense to conclude that those prospects—as a constitutional mat-
ter—render congressional standing off the table. Were it otherwise, future
Congresses might find themselves bound by majority decision of their
predecessors.
Thus assertions that standing should be absent when congressional ac-
tion theoretically may remove the injury are overstated. This said, if a self-
inflicted injury238 is not fairly traceable to the defendant,239 the extent to
236. See, e.g., Berger, supra note 206, at 305 (describing impeachment as “a last resort”);
Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Constitutional Showdowns, 156 U. Pa. L. Rev. 991, 994
(2008) (describing impeachments as “the most dramatic constitutional showdowns”); see also
Berger, supra note 206, at 340–41 (“To avoid adjudication [of disputes between the legislative
and executive branches] by resort to the leaky doctrine of ‘political questions’ is to throw
Congress back on its own resources, among them impeachment of the President for encroach-
ment on its prerogatives, for subversion of the Constitution.”); Posner & Vermeule, supra, at
1026–27 (lamenting the dearth of judicial precedent on legislative–executive disputes).
237. See Harrison, supra note 53, at 9 (“Impeachment . . . has never been a serious instru-
ment by which the houses of Congress influence executive policy.”).
238. That the injury is in some sense self inflicted raises the specter of Professor Robert
Pushaw’s argument that standing should be, and in practice generally is, limited to “ ‘acciden-
tal’ plaintiffs.” See Pushaw, Fortuity, supra note 188, at 324–47; Pushaw, Accidental Plaintiffs,
supra note 183, at 66–105 (arguing that standing is best understood to limit court access to
plaintiffs who have been injured because of chance events beyond their control). One might
hesitate to classify an affirmative decision by lawmakers to confer power on the executive
branch as fortuitous.
At the same time, if lawmakers in good faith believe that a bill would not permanently
shift power away from the legislative branch—that is, not for the purpose of generating an
advisory opinion—then one might say that the institution’s ongoing injury is in some sense
fortuitous. Still, again at the margins, this factor might have limited influence in the standing
calculus.
239. Cf. Leading Cases, Constitutional Law: Constitutional Structure, 111 Harv. L. Rev.
207, 226–27 (1997) (“[T]he injuries alleged [in Raines] were not fairly traceable to the actions
of the named defendants. . . . Rather, those alleged injuries were caused by legislators who
enacted the Line Item Veto Act . . . .” (footnote omitted)).
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which executive action is unilateral logically might make a difference at the
margins.
Comprehending both the extent to which executive action is unilateral
and the scope of the reduction in congressional bargaining power as contin-
uous variables allows us to construct a two-dimensional representation of
different types of executive action. This is reflected in Figure 1, where the x-
axis represents the extent to which executive action is unilateral, and the y-
axis represents the reduction of bargaining power (both normalized to run
from 0 to 1 (or, equivalently, 0% to 100%)). The curve represents a likely
boundary between settings in which congressional standing exists and does
not exist; the shaded area beneath the curve corresponds to settings in which
congressional standing does not exist.
Figure 1.
Graph of viability of standing as a function of the extent to which the executive action is
unilateral, and the breadth of the shift in power from the legislature to the executive
(shaded area corresponds to settings where standing is likely not viable).
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The points identified as A, B, C, and D correspond to the settings de-
scribed in Table 1. And, consistent with the discussion above, points A and
C lie within the shaded area, while points B and D do not. Point E corre-
sponds to a setting in which the executive branch has acted pursuant to an
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implicit grant of prosecutorial discretion—so that the executive action is
neither purely unilateral nor entirely joint—and the scope of the action has
little impact on the balance of power; there is no standing for a congres-
sional challenge. Finally, point F corresponds to a setting in which the exec-
utive branch has acted pursuant to a congressional delegation that, while
broad, has more constraint than the grant invalidated in Schecter Poultry did.
More generally, the frontier curve for congressional standing reflects the
notion that standing will be the exception rather than the rule.240 It also
adheres to the notion that larger shifts in power away from the legislature
are more likely to translate into viable standing. Finally, the boundary curve
is true to the notion that legislative complicity in the power shift will not
have a large impact on the viability of standing. Still, the curve increasingly
slopes downward (albeit only a little) as congressional complicity gets very
small, reflecting that very low levels of congressional involvement can reduce
the scope of the power shift (slightly) to accommodate standing.
C. Standing for Members of Congress Beyond Functional-Based
Congressional Standing
The bases for congressional standing arising out of congressional func-
tions define only bases for standing that are institutional—or, in the words
of the Raines case, “run with” congressional seats.241 As such, they supple-
ment, and are in addition to, bases for standing that are not institutional in
nature. Thus, for example, the excluded congressman in Powell v. McCor-
mack suffered an injury that, in Raines’s terms, was personal and did not run
with his seat.242 Congressional standing was properly found to exist, though
it would not fall within the rubric of function-based congressional standing.
Further, congressional standing exists because the party is a member, a
group of members, or a house of Congress. Sometimes a party may happen
to fit that description and enjoy standing, but not by virtue of the party’s
legislative status; in such cases, the standing that inheres is not congressional
standing. For example, a member of Congress likely has standing to chal-
lenge the constitutionality of a campaign-finance restriction, but that is be-
cause he is a candidate, not because he is a current officeholder.243 The
injury is to the member’s ability to campaign for office, not to her ability to
function while in office.
240. This narrow scope of my proposal for congressional standing contrasts with propos-
als by other commentators for quite minimal requirements for standing for voters, let alone
legislators. See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Standing and Spending—The Role of Legal and Equita-
ble Principles, 4 Chap. L. Rev. 1, 26–27, 49–50 (2001) (arguing for a standard for voter stand-
ing that would mirror the standard for shareholder standing against corporations).
241. See Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 821 (1997).
242. See supra notes 92–94 and accompanying text.
243. See, e.g., Shays v. FEC, 414 F.2d 76, 82 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (upholding standing of
congressmen who sponsored federal campaign legislation to challenge FEC’s implementation
of that legislation “not based on their sponsorship of the legislation, but rather as candidates
waging reelection contests governed by [the legislation]”).
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D. The Interplay Between Constitutional Congressional Standing and
Other Standing Doctrines
None of the foregoing is to say that the federal courts are under an
absolute obligation to hear disputes between the legislative and executive
branches. Even when there is core constitutional standing, other doctrines
may counsel against allowing a case to proceed in federal court.
First, the political-question doctrine may sometimes provide a basis for
federal courts to decline to hear interbranch controversies based on separa-
tion-of-powers concerns. The doctrine has application, for example, where
the Constitution commits resolution of the question at issue to the political
branches.244 The point remains, however, that—to whatever extent the polit-
ical-question doctrine might apply to preclude standing—the application of
the political-question doctrine in no way draws into doubt core Article III
standing.245
Another factor that might, consistent with the account of Article III
congressional standing I outlined above, figure into the prudential standing
calculus is whether one can readily imagine a private plaintiff who could
raise a similar challenge.246 The Court in Raines identified the availability of
a private plaintiff as potentially relevant to the standing calculus,247 but did
not specify whether the issue was constitutional or prudential. On reflection,
however, the availability should not be seen to affect constitutional standing.
Just as “[t]he assumption that if [plaintiffs] have no standing to sue, no one
would have standing, is not a reason to find standing,”248 the availability of
244. Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 518–19 (1969). Compare, e.g., Goldwater v.
Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 1002–04 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., concurring) (arguing that Coleman com-
pelled the conclusion that the question whether the Senate must vote on abrogating a treaty
was a nonjusticiable political question, and indeed that “the justifications for concluding that
the question here is political in nature are even more compelling than in Coleman because it
involves foreign relations—specifically a treaty commitment to use military force in the de-
fense of a foreign government if attacked”), with id. at 998–1002 (Powell, J., concurring) (ar-
guing that the political-question doctrine was inapplicable), and id. at 1006–07 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) (agreeing on that point with Justice Powell).
245. See supra notes 58–59 and accompanying text; see also Goldwater, 444 U.S. at 1006
(Blackmun, J., dissenting in part) (“It is . . . indefensible, without further study, to pass on the
issue of justiciability or on the issues of standing or ripeness.” (emphasis added)).
246. This suggests that private plaintiffs should in some sense displace institutional ones.
At odds with this idea, Professor Huq argues that, if the choice is between individual plaintiffs
and institutional plaintiffs (such as states and political branches), institutional plaintiffs may
be better positioned to advance structural constitutional claims. See Aziz Z. Huq, Standing for
the Structural Constitution, 99 Va. L. Rev. 1435, 1510–13 (2013); see also id. at 1469–89 (de-
tailing doctrinal problems with standing likely to arise when individuals pursue structural
constitutional claims).
247. See Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 829–30 (1997) (“[O]ur conclusion [does not] . . .
foreclose[ ] the Act from constitutional challenge (by someone who suffers judicially cogniza-
ble injury as a result of the Act). Whether the case would be different if [that fact] were
different we need not now decide.”).
248. Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1154 (2013) (quoting Valley Forge
Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 489
(1982); Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 227 (1974)).
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other plaintiffs who could file suit should not furnish a reason to deny
standing.
That said, there might be reasons to deny standing on prudential
grounds when a private plaintiff can reasonably be expected to file suit rais-
ing a similar challenge to that advanced by congressional plaintiffs.249 As
Justice Souter explained in his concurrence in Raines, “the certainty of a
plaintiff who obviously would have standing to bring a suit to court after the
politics had at least subsided from a full boil is a good reason to resolve
doubts about standing against the plaintiff invoking an official interest.”250
A final factor that reasonably might enter into the prudential standing
calculus is whether the legislative plaintiffs had sought reasonable self-help. I
have argued above the requirement that legislators seek impeachment is too
extreme.251 One could imagine, however, a more limited “exhaustion of leg-
islative remedies” requirement that at least called on legislative plaintiffs to
try to introduce bills that might (if they were enacted) reverse the action of
which the plaintiffs complain.252
Conclusion
This Article has argued that determinations of congressional standing
should consider the functions that Congress and its members fulfill. Beyond
the Court’s narrow construction of congressional function in Raines, Con-
gress gathers information, and therefore should have standing to vindicate
that information-gathering function. Moreover, the requirement that Con-
gress vote on bills empowers Congress to shape the law even if no actual
congressional vote on a proposal takes place; standing should be wide
enough to ensure that that bargaining power is not permanently diluted.
A functionalist approach is broadly consistent with existing standing
doctrine and the purposes underlying standing. It would not unduly open
249. And, indeed, Professor Huq suggests this will generally be the case. See Huq, supra
note 112, at 1677.
250. Raines, 521 U.S. at 835 (Souter, J., concurring).
At the same time, it is not free from doubt that a suit brought by a private plaintiff will be
preferable to a congressional lawsuit. See Note, supra note 94, at 1754 (“[A]llowing congress-
men, as opposed to private litigants, to sue to protect their legislative prerogatives would im-
prove the quality of adjudication by ensuring that the litigants have a true ‘personal stake’ in
the proceedings. Typically, congressmen who seek access to federal courts for separation of
powers disputes are better informed of the relevant legal and factual issues and have a more
immediate stake in the outcome of the case than most private citizens.” (footnotes omitted)).
251. See supra text following note 151.
252. Of course, if the bill actually became law, then any lawsuit would become moot.
Thus, a lawsuit presumably would proceed only if the bill did not become law.
Presumably as well, there would be no requirement for legislators to continue to submit
successive bills on generic promises from opponents that some more limited form of the bill
might move forward (or not be vetoed). Cf. Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 624–26
(2001) (finding no requirement under takings jurisprudence that landowner file repeated peti-
tions with a zoning agency when the agency has made clear that such petitions would be
futile).
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the floodgates of litigation or invite the federal courts to render advisory
opinions. Finally, prudential considerations would continue to serve as gate-
keepers to ensure that too many political questions do not migrate to the
judicial branch for resolution.
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